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Abstract
In the past few years, there have been several new developments in the way real estate
investment trusts (REITs) access capital. There has been an increasing trend toward the use of
unsecured debt, and REITs may also alter their dividend policy in order to generate capital
internally to the extent they can. There has been little empirical research into the market's
reaction to unsecured debt and the apparent changes in dividend policy in REITs. This thesis
explores the impact of unsecured debt on REIT capital structure and changes in dividend policy.
We have been able to identify what appears to be a regime shift during the study period. It
appears that the market is finding unsecured debt and higher retained earnings more acceptable in
REITs.
The first part of this thesis explores the stock-price reaction to the addition of unsecured
debt in the capital structure of REITs. Based on an event study of unsecured debt offerings,
negative average abnormal returns were observed in a sample of initial public offerings during a
five-day period leading up to and including the offering date. Positive abnormal average returns
were observed in a sample of secondary offerings of public debt during the same five-day period.
There appears to be a trend in the abnormal returns lessening in their severity over time.
Through a regression analysis, we have identified the future growth impounded in the stock price
as a major determinant of the negative abnormal return in 1PO issues. We have also examined
the determinants in the pricing of unsecured debt and found further evidence of a regime shift as
different variables explain the pricing of recent issues of unsecured debt than the pricing of
earlier issues.
The next section of the thesis examines the debt-equity choice in REIT capital structure.
Liquidity, growth expectations, leverage, property focus, performance, ownership structure and
other aspects of REIT capital structure have been introduced into a logistic regression model as
explanatory variables. Aspects of leverage, growth expectations, size and age appear significant
in the debt-equity choice. Finally, the thesis includes a study of the dividend policy of REITs.
First, we have identified a long-term trend toward lowering payout ratios. In examining the
characteristics that explain the dividend payout ratio, we have found the effects of size, leverage
and liquidity to have significantly changed over the study period. This reinforces our findings of
a regime shift in REITs.
Thesis Supervisor: Timothy J. Riddiough
Title: Assistant Professor of Real Estate Finance
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Chapter 1: Introduction
REITs are tax-exempt corporations that may be publicly or privately traded and that
derive their revenue from income-producing real estate. REITs are required to pay out 95% of
their net income as defined by the Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) as
dividends. This payout requirement limits REITs' ability to generate capital internally through
retained earnings for portfolio expansion and capital improvements on existing properties.
Therefore, in order to raise capital to grow, REITs must look to outside sources. These sources
have traditionally been secured debt or mortgages and equity offerings through the public
markets.
Since 1993, equity REITs have increasingly turned to unsecured debt, rather than secured
debt or equity, to fund capital needs. According to the National Association of Real Estate
Investment Trusts (NAREIT), there were 73 unsecured debt issues in 1996 for a total of $4.8
billion and 45 unsecured debt issues in the first half of 1997 for a total of $2.6 billion (See
Exhibit 1). In fact, unsecured debt offerings represented 27% of all capital raised by REITs in
1996 and 17% of all capital raised by REITs in the first half of 1997. This is a dramatic change
from 1991, 1992 and 1993 when unsecured debt made up 7%, 12% and 7% respectively of the
capital raised by REITs.
It is unclear why REITs are using unsecured debt rather than traditional secured debt or
equity to fund capital requirements. Moreover, there are several theoretical arguments as to why
issuing unsecured debt may be disadvantageous to REITs. These arguments fall into three
categories: tax-incentives, information signaling, and agency conflicts between bondholders and
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stockholders. REIT Management, however, claims that unsecured debt provides a lower cost of
capital and greater operational flexibility.
Exhibit 1
Securities Issued by REITs
(000S)
This thesis examines the effects of the offerings of unsecured debt on REITs in terms of
existing theory and literatures related both to corporate capital structure in general and to REIT-
capital structure in particular. The thesis then presents empirical studies that seek to:
1. Document the stock-price reactions to unsecured debt issues by REITs as a proxy for
the impact on the overall cost of capital;
2. Identify determinants of the stock-price reactions to unsecured debt issues by REITs;
3. Identify determinants of the pricing of unsecured debt issued by REITs;
4. Identify the characteristics of REITs that choose to issue unsecured debt over equity;
and
5. Identify the determinants of dividend policy and in the context of REIT capital
structure.
The first portion of the analysis in the thesis is to measure the effect that a change in a
firm's capital structure has in conveying information to investors through an event study. For the
event study, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis has been used to determine the
normal relationship between each stock and the market. The market model has then been used to
measure the abnormal daily stock return for each firm during the five-day period leading up to
and including the offering date of the unsecured debt. A student's t-test has been used as a test
statistic to determine the statistical significance of the average abnormal returns for the event
period.
The next phase of the analysis is to disentangle the characteristics of the REIT and the
debt offerings to explain the market's reaction, in terms of a calculated abnormal daily return. To
do this, various characteristics of the market, the issuing firm and the specific debt instruments
are regressed against the abnormal return determined in the event study.
The next part of the analysis contains a series of regressions that seek to explain the
pricing of the unsecured debt issues. Many of the characteristics that are significant in
determining the magnitude of the abnormal daily return are also significant in determining the
unsecured debt issue's price.
In Chapter 6 the thesis identifies the factors that encourage REITs to issue unsecured debt
for their capital needs, instead of traditional mortgage debt or equity. The methodology
employed is a logit regression model, and the dependent variable in the model is the probability
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that a REIT will issue unsecured debt instead of equity. The regression analyzes the reasons for
unsecured debt offerings by identifying and examining issues pertinent to the capital structure of
REITs', prior to the public offering of debt or equity. Undertaking an F-test to eliminate
variables that are insignificant has further refined the regression equation.
The final chapters of the thesis examine REIT dividend policy. As REITs have become
more prominent in the market, we hypothesize that the payout ratio will decrease allowing REITs
to generate capital through retained earnings to the extent possible given the minimum-payout
requirements. These two chapters include an analysis of the changing dividend policy of REITs
over time by property focus, and OLS regression analyses that seek the factors that explain
differing dividend policies among REITs.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Capital Structure without Frictions or Taxes
In "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958),"
Modigliani and Miller formulate the basis for modem capital structure theory. Modigliani and
Miller's first proposition (MM I) argues that, in a marketplace without friction or taxes, firm
value is unaffected by capital structure.' This argument is based on the assumption that investors
can effectively undo the effects of corporate leverage by borrowing at the investor level.
Modigliani and Miller's second proposition (MM II) states that any increase in leverage is
exactly offset by an increase in risk and is reflected by a higher required return on equity. Cash
flows will thus be discounted at an appropriately higher discount rate to compensate for any
changes in the equity risk. With minimal debt levels, the relationship between the amount of
debt and the return on equity is approximately linear. However, the required rate of return will
increase at some point where debt holders demand to be compensated for increased levels of risk
due to a higher probability of financial distress.
Since Modigliani and Miller's celebrated MM I and MM II, there has been a slew of
literature addressing the impact of taxes on a firm's capital structure and various other frictions
including agency costs, asymmetric information and corporate control. The major works in each
of these categories is reviewed below.
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller, 1958, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment," American
Economic Review, 53, 261-297.
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Taxes
Modigliani and Miller argue that capital structure does not matter in a frictionless
marketplace without taxes and that the addition of capital raised through debt at a lower interest
rate does not change the firm's weighted average cost of capital. However, a later work by
Modigliani and Miller in "Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utilities Industry
(1966),"92 argues that firms can increase their value through the use of debt by creating a tax
shield. In an effort to maximize firm value, firms should borrow as much as possible. However,
their theory neglected to incorporate personal income taxes. In an even later paper titled "Debt
and Taxes (1977),"3 Miller expanded this idea to formulate a theory about which firms benefit
from increased leverage.
The goal of the corporation should be to maximize income after all corporate and
personal taxes are paid. Interest paid to bondholders can be deducted from the income on which
corporate taxes (Tc) are paid and therefore provides a tax shield to the corporation. The
effective personal tax rate on equity income (Tpe) is less than the personal income tax rate (T)
paid on interest income because capital gains are not taxed until the stock is sold and the gain is
realized. Therefore, the relative advantage of debt is defined by the relationship between the
corporate income-tax rate, the personal income tax rate and the effective tax rate on equity-
income.
2 Miller, M. and F. Modigliani, 1966, "Some Estimates of the Cost of Capital to the Electric Utilities Industry, 1954-1957,"
American Economic Review, 56, 333-39 1.
3 Miller, M., 1977, "Debt and Taxes," Journal of Finance, 32, 261-275.
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The Relative Advantage of Debt
Relative advantage of debt = (I Ta) (1)(1- Tpe 1- Tc)
The income paid out as interest after all taxes is defined as (1- Tp). Equity income after all taxes
is (1 - Tpe)(1 - Tc). Therefore, the relative advantage of debt, incorporating both personal and
corporate taxes, is the fraction identified in Equation 1.4 Since REITs are not taxed at the
corporate level (Tc = 0), the denominator of Equation 1 is larger for REITs than for corporations
that do pay taxes and the relative advantage of debt is less.
Based on differences between the effective personal tax rate on equity (Tpe) and the tax
rate on interest income (Tp), Miller hypothesizes that the debt holder must be compensated for
the higher taxes paid on interest income versus the taxes paid corporate income and on capital
gains.5  Miller describes the optimal corporate debt level to exist in equilibrium between
aggregate supply and demand. The firm achieves this equilibrium when corporate savings
resulting from the debt tax shield equals the additional taxes paid by the debt holders. Beyond
this point, a firm no longer benefits by taking on additional debt.
DeAngelo and Masulis expand this work by observing that, with tax shields other than
debt, a firm is sometimes uncertain if it will be able to take advantage of the additional tax
shields provided by additional debt. They identify an optimal tax-induced debt level where the
expected net tax advantage of debt is exhausted. Under this optimal debt tax shield policy, a
Brealey, R.A. and S.C. Myers, 1991, "Principles of Corporate Finance, Fourth Edition," McGraw-Hill Book Company, 426.
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decrease in leverage indicates that management expects to use a smaller tax shield, which in most
cases means lower earnings.6
Both DeAngelo and Masulis and Modigliani and Miller base their arguments for optimal
corporate debt level based on the value of a tax shield. The REIT structure, however, is not taxed
at the corporate level (Tc=0) and therefore has no use for a tax shield. In fact, based on the
relative advantage of debt as presented by Modigliani and Miller, REITs have a relative
disadvantage from using any debt at all. This finding is consistent with Brealey and Myers who
conclude that "for companies that do not expect to use the corporate tax shield, there is a
moderate tax disadvantage." 7
Agency Cost
Agency costs arise out of a conflict of interest or misaligned incentives. These conflicts
can be between management and stockholders or between stockholders and bondholders. Jensen
(1986)8 identifies one potential conflict of interest between stockholders and management that
arises because management does not capture the entire gain from profit enhancements. The
conflict arises because management holds less than 100 percent of the residual value of the firm;
the more diverse the equity in the firm, the greater the conflict of interest. If management holds
only a small fraction of the residual of the firm, management is tempted to use resources that
5 Taxes on capital gains are effectively lower than taxes on interest even when the nominal tax rates are the same. This is because
taxes on capital gains are not paid until the capital gain is realized through the sale of the asset.
6 Harry DeAngelo and Ronald W. Masulis, "Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation," Journal of
Financial Economics 8 (1980):3-30
7 Brealey, R.A. and S.C. Myers, 1991, "Principles of Corporate Finance, Fourth Edition," McGraw-Hill Book Company, 433.
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could go to stockholders for "perquisites" such as corporate jets and extravagant office space. By
adding debt to the capital structure of the firm, the amount of free cash flow available to
management for overinvestment in fringe benefits that do not benefit the stockholders is limited.
This conflict is especially relevant to REITs since the REIT legislation mandates diverse
ownership, increasing the likelihood of this agency cost. Therefore, from an overinvestment
standpoint, debt in the capital structure of REITs is beneficial.
Harris and Raviv and by Stulz also identify conflicts of interest between management and
equity holders in which the two parties disagree on operating decisions. Harris and Raviv
identify a conflict in which management and stockholders disagree on whether or not to liquidate
the assets of the firm. Their argument assumes that management always wants to continue the
firm's operation, even if liquidating the firm is in the best interest of the stockholders. According
to Harris and Raviv, more debt in the capital structure gives outside investors the ability to
efficiently liquidate in the event cash flow is poor.9
Stulz looks at the conflict slightly differently by identifying management's incentive to
invest in a new project, even if it is the best interest of management to pay out cash as dividends.
Stulz concludes that the introduction of debt in the capital structure limits free cash flow and the
ability of management to overinvest.10 This is slightly different than the Jensen argument, which
identifies an incentive to overinvest in "perquisites" that benefit management directly at the
expense of stockholders. The Stulz argument identifies a more subtlety conflicting
8 Jensen, Michael, "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers," American Economic Review, 1986, 76,
323-339
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overinvestment. In the Stulz argument, management has an incentive to invest in projects that
provide sub-optimal returns to stockholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976)" identify a conflict between stockholders and bondholders,
which provides a disincentive for debt in a firm's capital structure called the asset substitution
effect. With debt in the corporate capital structure, if the gain from an investment is great, the
stockholders receive most of the benefits of the investment. If the investment fails on the other
hand, bondholders bear the consequences. This provides incentive for stockholders to "go for
broke" with risky investments in which the odds of default on the debt are high. Jensen and
Meckling hypothesized that the optimal capital structure balances the costs and benefits of debt
using bond covenants and other contractual mechanisms to limit asset substitution. They
conclude that when asset substitution opportunities are low, such as in stable firms with fixed
and tangible assets, higher debt levels would be expected. Conversely, when asset substitution
opportunities are high, as in volatile firms with intangible assets such as future growth
opportunities, low debt levels would be expected. The Jensen and Meckling argument suggests
that REITs that are trading at high premiums to book value with large amounts of future growth
impounded into the stock price would have less debt in the capital structure than more stable
REITs that are trading at less of a premium.
9 Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur, Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20,
55-86
10 Stulz, Rene, 1990, "Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies," Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 3-27.
" Jensen, Michael and Meckling, William, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure"
Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3, 305-360
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In the "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,"12 Myers argues that a firm that has
included risky debt in its capital structure effectively splits the benefits from positive NPV
projects between stockholders and bondholders. A firm's future growth potential is a product of
that firm's future positive investment opportunities as well as the likelihood the firm will act on
those opportunities in an optimal manner. When debt levels are sufficiently high, bondholders
capture a greater portion of the benefits from a positive NPV investment. As a result
stockholders and management may have an incentive to underinvest in positive NPV projects.
Myers claims that agency conflicts can be controlled by including less debt in a firm's
capital structure, through restrictive covenants in its indenture agreements, and by shortening the
maturity of debt. The market reaction to an unsecured debt offering may therefore be contingent
on the debt levels of the issuing firm, the degree to which the restrictive covenants protect
bondholder's interests, and the length of the debt maturity. This argument explains part of the
evolution of the unsecured debt of REITs as the markets have searched for the optimal
combination of restrictive covenants.
Asymmetric Information
Myers and Majluf 3 explore the effects of asymmetric information between management
and the market about a firm's growth potential and its impact on a firm's method for raising
capital. They hypothesize that when managers have information that investors do not have
(asymmetric information), management will act in the best interests of existing stockholders. In
12 Myers, S.C., 1977, "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 147-175.
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this case, management with positive information concerning the firm's investment prospects will
seek to retain that upside for the existing stockholders by issuing debt before issuing equity. For
management to act in the best interest of existing stockholders it should raise capital with
additional equity only when the stock is overpriced. Therefore, when there is imperfect
information and equity is used to raise additional capital, the market assumes the stock is
overpriced and adjusts share value down. The more information is imperfect, the greater the
reduction in stock price. Thus, the degree to which there is asymmetric information may
influence management's decision to raise capital through either debt or equity. This explains the
information revolution in real estate brought about by REITs. Because REITs have to access the
capital markets to access capital, the more information they can provide the market, the less of an
asymmetric-information effect will affect the REITs stock price. One benefit of issuing
unsecured debt instead of equity may be an easing of the information requirements of the market.
The asymmetric-information argument requires that management have superior
information regarding future prospects for the company. However, since the market knows that
REITs' ability to raise capital through retained earnings is limited, and thus that in order to grow,
external capital must be raised, the perception of asymmetric information is mitigated to some
extent. Moreover, REITs have been increasingly forthcoming with information regarding their
investments. By providing the market with good information regarding the company's
investment strategy, asymmetric information becomes less of a concern. However, the degree to
13 Myers, S.C. and N.S. Majluf, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do
Not Have," Journal of Finance, 13, 1984, 187-221.
-15-
which information is available to the market may have a strong influence on a REIT's decision to
issue debt or equity.
Corporate Control
Harris and Raviv13 (1991) identify the optimal ownership share as being determined by
management, trading off capital gains on its stake in the firm against the loss of benefits derived
from control. The main objective is to maximize their expected payoff, the value of equity plus
the benefits of control. The issuance of unsecured debt, as opposed to equity, could be perceived
as an attempt to maintain control by incumbent REIT managers, where managers will continue to
receive, in addition to the benefits of control, the value of compensatory benefits in the form of
management fees. Increasing the levels of debt within the firm will maintain the relative control
of the existing equity. Therefore, the optimal mix of debt and equity will maximize
management's payoff. Harris and Raviv discuss the issue of takeover at length, but any
suppositions as to the correlation between the increased issuance of unsecured debt and control,
would be difficult to substantiate and formulate. In general there is evidence that increases in
leverage reduce the likelihood of corporate takeovers. This argument for leverage does not
particularly hold true for REITs because the extent of diffuse ownership makes REITs less
attractive as takeover targets.
The regulatory requirement that restricts the concentration of ownership in REITs, to no
more than fifty percent of share ownership by five of fewer stockholders, exacerbates the
13 Harris, Milton and Raviv, Artur, "The Theory of Capital Structure", Journal of Finance, 1991, 297-355
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problems of control. Although look through provisions have been made especially for pension
funds, mutual funds and others, which allow for more concentrated ownership, this issue of
diffuse ownership means that there is less incentive to closely monitor management, and that the
takeover discipline within the corporate realm is diminished. The issuance of equity results in
the dilution of ownership among new and existing stockholders, whereas the use of debt
securities maintains the status quo in the level of concentration in ownership. Common stock,
rather than debt, provides the investor with voting rights. Therefore, capital structure decisions
by management can affect the distribution of votes and percentages of ownership.
Dividend Policy
In 1961 Miller and Modigliani14 published a paper on the irrelevance of dividend policy
in an efficient market (i.e. a world of no taxes, transaction costs, and market friction). In an
efficient market, dividend policy should simply be a by-product of a firm's investment and
financing decisions.
Brealey and Myers describe three schools of thought with respect to dividend policy:
advocates of high payout ratios, advocates of low payout ratios and, those that believe the value
of the firm is unaffected by dividend policy. 15 The advocates of high payout ratios argue that
more dividends allow investors to avoid the transactions costs associated with the sale of shares
by investors that want to realize cash proceeds. High dividends are also seen as a positive signal
14 Miller, M. and Modigliani, F., 'Dividend Policy, Growth and the valuation of Shares.' Journal of Business 34, Oct 1961, 411-
433.
15 Brealey, R. and Myers, S., "Principles of Corporate Finance." McGraw Hill , 5th Ed., 1996, 417-438.
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of the firm's earnings prospects if there is information asymmetry between investors and
management. Lastly, high payout ratio helps mitigate the distrust investors have for management
overinvesting or partaking in 'empire-building' with retained earnings.
Advocates for a low payout ratio make their argument from a tax perspective. They argue
that when the tax rate on capital gains is lower than the tax rate on dividends, firms should pay a
lower dividend. In addition, the fact that taxes on capital gains taxes are deferred until the
security is sold and the gain is realized, lends further credence to this argument for lower
payouts. Masulis argues that this tax-deferral implies that the existing shareholders would
require a lower rate of return on internal funds, relative to external funds. In this scenario
investors would prefer firms with low dividend yields. Firms that pay high dividends are also
assumed to be financing new projects by issuing new shares of stock. This behavior not only
forgoes the tax-deferral for existing shareholders but also incurs transaction costs associated with
the issues.
Finally, those that maintain the value of the firm is independent of dividend policy, argue
that firms have not been able to increase stock prices by changes in dividend policy. Therefore
existing shareholders are in effect getting what they want in dividends, whether dividends are
high or low.
REITs are required to payout 95% of their net income as dividends, and this limits their
ability to retain earnings. As there is a significant interdependence between the firm's
investment, financing and dividend decisions, and the forced payout from REITs has an
16 Masulis, R., "The Debt/Equity Choice." Ballinger Publishing Co. 1989, 85-88.
-18-
important implication for the firm's financing and investment decisions. The payout requirement
effectively reduces the equity capital within the firm, and REITs must access the capital markets
often to finance future growth opportunities.
The regulated payout by REITs was a result of the distrust investors had for management
in not behaving in the best interest of the existing stockholders. This sentiment lends support to
the argument for high payout ratios as previously outlined, although, the existence of a current
tax-differential between capital gains and dividends favors a low payout ratio.17 In the case of
tax-exempt entities like pension funds this differential does not exist and high payouts may be
preferred.
Masulis18 has identified that current dividend policy and debt financing have significant
effects on the firm's investment decision. Holding the firm's investment decisions constant, an
increasing reliance on unsecured debt financing by some REITs could have an impact on the
level of dividend payouts. It may also be reasonable to assume that the market may react
positively to a change in REIT dividend policy, especially, if the change is perceived as an
attempt at internal financing as opposed to continually raising relatively expensive debt or equity
capital in the public markets.
17 The current tax rate on capital gains is 28%, and the tax rate on dividends can range from 31% to 39.6% depending on the
income tax bracket. Benefits arise from the deferral of dividends payouts, which reduces the present value of the investors
personal tax liability.
18 Masulis, R., "The Debt/Equity Choice." Ballinger Publishing Co. 1989.
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Chapter 3: Price Reaction Studies to Changes in Capital Structure
There is significant evidence that changes in a firm's capital structure convey new
information to investors and affect stock prices. Research by Masulis (1980)19 and Dann
(1981)20 document positive abnormal returns when taxable firms decrease their equity positions
through stock repurchase. Asquith and Mullins (1986) recorded negative abnormal stock price
returns in response to a firm issuing seasoned common stock and thus lowering the debt to equity
ratio.21
The REIT tax-exempt status provides a different environment in which to observe the
market reaction to a change in corporate capital structure. In order to examine the market
reaction to a REIT's shift to include unsecured debt in its capital structure, an event study have
been conducted which examines a firm's stock price reaction to the announcement of its
unsecured debt offering. Further, in an effort to disentangle the forces guiding the market
reaction, cross sectional regressions have been used to relate the offering induced abnormal stock
returns to characteristics of the debt offering and firm financial ratios.
Event Study Design
An event study is an econometric model that measures the effect of an economic event on
the value of a firm. "The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact that, given rationality in
19 Masulis, R.W., "The Effects of Capital Structure change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers," Journal of Finance,
8, 1980, 139-178.
20 Dann, L.Y., "Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders," Journal of Finance, 9,
1981, 113-138.
21 Asquith, P. and D.W. Mullins, Jr., "Equity Issues and Offering Dilution," Journal of Financial Economics, July 1986.
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the marketplace, the effect of an event will be reflected immediately in asset price. Thus the
event's economic impact can be measured using asset prices over a relatively short time
period."2 2 The procedure for conducting an event study to measure abnormal returns is outlined
in the Econometrics of Financial Markets.
Event Definition and Event Window Selection
First, the event and the event window are defined. The event for this study is the offering
of an unsecured debt issue by a REIT. The event window is the period of time over which the
affect of the event is measured. The event window for the abnormal return has been defined as
the day the unsecured debt issue was offered (day 0) and the four days prior to the offering (days
-4 to -1).
Selection Criteria
The selection criteria are defined for the inclusion of a specific event and the sample of
events is collected. A list of REIT unsecured debt offerings for the period 1988 through June
1997 was obtained from Dean Witter Morgan Stanley. This list was expanded to include other
offerings whose offering date could be verified through company press releases, and the pricing
and timing confirmed through the Bloomberg database.
A number of these offerings were excluded from the event study. These included
offerings from health-care REITs, offerings that were timed to coincide with the ex-dividend date
of the stock and medium-term note issues that took place after a shelf registration. Health-care
22 Campbell, John Y., Lo, Andrew W. and MacKinlay, A. Craig, Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton University Press,
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REITs have been omitted from the analysis because there is debate over whether health-care
REITs derive their income from real estate or from the delivery of health-care services.
A number of firms timed their offering date of the unsecured debt to closely coincide with
the quarterly ex-dividend date. Six of the first seven unsecured debt IPOs were timed to occur
within 5 days of an ex-dividend day. For this reason, there may be a confounding effect on stock
price for these firms around the event period, as a result of both the debt issuance and the
dividend. Therefore, firms that timed their debt offerings with dividends between days -4 and 0
were excluded from the data set.
A more recent trend is the medium-term note program. With medium-term notes
programs, a REIT announces its intention to issue a maximum amount of unsecured debt over a
specific period of time and completes a shelf-registration of the notes at the same time. Portions
of the shelf-registration are then issued at various times during the prescribed period. These
issues vary in size and are sometimes placed privately. The information provided to the market
by the issue of medium term notes is therefore spread over the time period of the first
announcement and the date of the last issue. This spreading out of the information flow
confounds the reliability of the event study. Therefore, issues of medium-term notes have been
excluded from the sample.
Based on the defined selection criteria, a total of 68 unsecured debt issues have been
included in the sample. These issues include 29 initial offerings (IPOs) and 39 secondary or
follow-on offerings. Of the IPOs, 13 took place between September 1, 1993 and December 31,
1997, page 149
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1995, and 16 IPOs took place between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 1997. Of the follow-on
issues, 15 took place before 1996 and 24 took place after 1995.
Normal and Abnormal Returns
An abnormal return is the difference between the expected normal return and the actual
return. For each event in the sample, the expected normal return is calculated for the event using
the market model, which assumes a constant beta or relationship between the return of the
individual security and the market as a whole. To calculate the beta for each firm, first an
estimation window must be defined. The estimation window is the period over which each
security is observed in order to establish its beta and expected normal return, usually the period
immediately preceding the event window. For the purposes of this analysis, the estimation
window selected is days -10 to -64. The goal in selecting this estimation window is to choose
the longest period of time over which the fewest potentially confounding events would possibly
occur. One major potentially confounding event is the announcement and implementation of
dividend policy. Since most REITs pay dividends on a quarterly basis, the estimation window
was selected so that the combination of the estimation window and the event window comprise
no more than one quarter or approximately 65 trading days. Also, in order to mitigate potential
abnormal returns due to information leaks five trading days prior to the actual issue of unsecured
debt, days -5 to -9, have been omitted from both the event window and the estimation window.
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Estimation Procedure
In order to measure the normal return for each day of the event window and for each day
of the estimation window, the market model was used. Equation 2 is the equation for the market
model.
(r, -rft =aJ + PB(r,. -r,) + E, (2)
The return (r) for each firm (j) for each day (t) is measured by the change in the closing stock
price for each day assuming immediate dividend reinvestment based on the ex-dividend date.
Historic closing stock quotes were obtained from the Prophet Information Service, Inc., through
America Online. The historic dividends for each firm were obtained from the Datastream
database and confirmed with the Bloomberg database. The daily risk-free rate was measured by
dividing the quoted daily annual yield of three-month treasury instruments by 360 days in the
year. The daily treasury quotes were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank. The daily market
return was measured using the changing closing price of the Standard and Poor's index of 500
stocks (S&P 500), assuming immediate reinvestment of the daily dividend for the index. The
daily S&P 500 quotes and dividends were obtained from the Bloomberg database. Next, using
standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, the alpha and beta coefficients for each
firm were generated using data during the estimation window (days t = -64 to -10).
The calculated betas for the REIT stocks range from a low of -0.517 to a high of 0.989.
The mean beta for the sample is 0.234 and the median beta for the sample is 0.202. The alpha
intercepts are relatively close to zero with a range of -0.0025 to 0.0032 and a mean of 0.0003.
The alpha and beta coefficients for the sample are summarized in Exhibit 2.
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Exhibit 2
Summary of Alpha and Beta Coefficients
No. Security Date Alpha Beta No. Security Date Alpha Beta
1 KIM 09/24/93 0.0032 -0.1360 35 SCN 05/14/96 -0.0010 0.1438
2 KIM 02/03/94 -0.0011 0.5939 36 TRI 05/17/96 -0.0004 0.3344
3 WIR 02/16/94 -0.0013 0.9890 37 UDR 07/09/96 0.0016 0.5301
4 UDR 03/30/94 -0.0013 0.6518 38 SPK 07/17/96 0.0018 0.5366
5 TCO 06/22/94 -0.0013 0.6518 39 CLP 07/18/96 0.0012 0.0142
6 UDR 09/20/94 -0.0016 0.4462 40 EQR 08/08/96 0.0015 0.1917
7 TCO 10/28/94 -0.0016 0.4462 41 WRE 08/08/96 0.0000 0.2600
8 EQR 12/14/94 -0.0025 0.8358 42 FRT 08/13/96 0.0009 0.1403
9 FRT 01/11/95 0.0009 0.5965 43 PTR 10/16/96 0.0003 0.3522
10 WRP 01/23/95 0.0020 0.5033 44 CCG 10/18/96 0.0001 0.1060
11 CPJ 02/23/95 0.0000 0.6251 45 RET 10/31/96 0.0003 0.0860
12 SCN 02/24/95 0.0016 0.3480 46 SUS 11/04/96 0.0000 0.1289
13 NPR 03/30/95 0.0009 0.2719 47 CPT 11/14/96 0.0017 0.1438
14 EQR 04/13/95 -0.0007 -0.3008 48 OAS 11/20/96 -0.0001 0.1190
15 AEC 04/19/95 -0.0015 0.0089 49 SPG 11/21/96 0.0015 0.1774
16 SCN 05/09/95 -0.0016 0.2254 50 HIW 11/26/96 -0.0007 0.4761
17 DDR 05/10/95 -0.0001 0.1338 51 SPK 12/05/96 0.0011 -0.0065
18 NPR 05/31/95 0.0005 0.3554 52 CLP 01/15/97 0.0029 -0.0364
19 TCO 06/22/95 0.0010 -0.0643 53 UDR 01/22/97 0.0017 0.1028
20 WRP 08/21/95 0.0007 0.2556 54 SEA 01/22/97 0.0022 -0.0791
21 AVN 09/13/95 0.0001 0.3220 55 ENN 02/10/97 0.0026 0.2630
22 DRE 09/19/95 0.0005 0.2873 56 PPS 03/03/97 0.0001 0.0846
23 RET 10/27/95 0.0005 0.1428 57 PTR 03/27/97 0.0023 0.2885
24 MRY 11/03/95 0.0002 -0.2722 58 SHU 04/22/97 -0.0006 0.2639
25 AEC 11/10/95 -0.0001 0.1975 59 0 05/01/97 -0.0009 0.3821
26 FFA 11/21/95 0.0014 -0.0169 60 CPT 05/06/97 0.0001 0.1720
27 FRT 12/04/95 -0.0019 0.6334 61 FR 05/08/97 0.0009 0.4122
28 SPK 12/06/95 0.0030 -0.5165 62 NPR 05/14/97 -0.0016 0.1774
29 CCG 01/23/96 0.0016 0.1965 63 KIM 05/27/97 -0.0014 0.2071
30 CPT 02/15/96 0.0030 0.1813 64 SUS 05/29/97 -0.0003 0.2297
31 PTR 02/20/96 0.0009 0.2277 65 WRI 06/16/97 -0.0001 0.1018
32 SKT 03/07/96 0.0009 -0.0071 66 RET 06/17/97 0.0001 0.1556
33 IRT 03/21/96 0.0012 -0.1890 67 SPG 06/20/97 -0.0011 0.3050
34 SUI 04/24/96 -0.0004 0.0913 68 BRE 06/23/97 -0.0017 0.4310
Once the regression coefficients have been calculated, the market model is used to
measure abnormal daily stock price returns for all days in the series including both the event
window and observation window (days t = -64 to 5). Abnormal returns are defined as the
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difference between a stock's actual total daily return (R1 ) and the expected daily return (N,) as
predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The daily abnormal return (ARyt) for firm j on day
t is defined as the residual of the actual daily return and the expected daily return (Equation 3):
ARt = Rt - Rt 3
R, =[aj + Pj(Rmt - Rft) + Rft
where:
R = Actual return for firmj on day t
Rj = Expected return for firmj on day t
Rft = Risk-free rate on day t
/9 = Firm j's beta coefficient from days -64 to -10
a = Firm j's alpha coefficient from days -64 to -10
Rmt = S&P 500 return on day t.
The average abnormal return (AAR) for each day t over all the firms in the sample with N
events is defined in Equation 4.
AARt= AR, (4)
j=1
Test Statistic under the Null Hypothesis
The appropriate hypothesis test given the size of the sample and the characteristics of its
distribution is the Student's t-test, summarized in Equation 5. The null hypothesis to be tested is
that the average abnormal return on day t (AAR,) equals zero.
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Tstat = AAR
S(AAR,)
i N
AAR =-IARj,
Nj=1
_ (5)
-10 AAR 
-A
S(AAR,)= , '
t=-64 P-1
1 -10
A=- X AARt
t=-64
The T-stat is the ratio of AAR, to the standard deviation of the excess return for the
sample S(AAR,) for t equals 1 through P. P equals the number of days in the estimation window
(days -64 to -10, or 55).
Potential Measurement Problems
The event day 0 represents the day on which the unsecured debt offering occurred, not
when the offering became public information. Typically, on the day of the offering an
announcement is issued by the REIT and one or more rating agency, that contains the
characteristics of the bonds, including size, coupon, duration and the ratings received from the
various rating agencies. For firms issuing IPO unsecured debt, this announcement conveys at
least two important types of information for a firm issuing its first rated debt. First, management
is announcing its intention to change its capital structure by adding unsecured debt. As argued
above, this may provide a signal to the market about the firm's future growth opportunities.
Also, the rating itself provides new information to the market regarding the quality of the firm's
management and an investment in the firm. Occasionally, a REIT will announce that it has been
rated as a firm some days or weeks prior to the issue of a rated security, and the security then
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receives a new rating when it is issued. The event study methodology does not attempt to
disentangle these two types of information, which may confound analysis surrounding the results
of the study.
Results and Conclusions
Average abnormal return calculations were conducted on the 68 events in a number of
permutations. First, all issues were analyzed. Then the issues were divided into IPOs and
follow-on offerings as an IPO of unsecured REIT debt may signal a change in corporate strategy,
whereas secondary offerings only confirm a continuation of this strategy. Then, the groups were
divided temporally in order to examine whether there has been a change in average abnormal
returns over time. The results of the event study are summarized in Exhibit 3.
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Exhibit 3
Summary of Event Study Results
All Unsecured Debt Issues
Day AR t-stat
-4 0.00% 0.020
-3 0.06% 0.433
-2 0.04% 0.302
-1 -0.11% -0.808
0 0.14% 0.971
CAR(-4,0) 0.14% 0.953
IPO Issues All Pre-1996 Post-1995
Day AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat
-4 -0.17% -0.796 0.11% 0.346 -0.40% -1.616
-3 -0.06% -0.260 -0.34% -1.083 0.18% 0.707
-2 -0.24% -1.097 -0.27% -0.846 -0.22% -0.862
-1 -0.46% -2.120 -0.96% -3.037 -0.06% -0.222
0 0.04% 0.196 0.28% 0.873 -0.15% -0.591
CAR(-4,0) -0.89% -4.092 -1.20% -3.770 -0.62% -2.584
Follow-On Issues All Pre-1996 Post-1995
Da AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat
-4 0.13% 0.731 -0.19% -0.521 0.32% 1.757
-3 0.15% 0.812 0.90% 2.428 -0.37% -1.984
-2 0.25% 1.377 0.24% 0.635 0.21% 1.123
-1 0.14% 0.789 0.16% 0.441 0.20% 1.059
0 0.21% 1.134 0.21% 0.559 0.21% 1.159
CAR(-4,0) 0.90% 4.902 1.34% 3.603 0.58% 3.127
Overall Observations
The event study results indicate that there is no significant average abnormal return, either
positive or negative, for all 68 issues on days -4 through 0, either individually or cumulatively.
The study indicates a cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) of 14 basis points with a
student's T-stat of +0.953. Most of the T-stats for the AARs on days 0 through -4 are lower than
the T-stat for the CAR, indicating that there is no consistent trend in the abnormal return on any
of the individual days either.
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IPOs
When the IPO issues of unsecured debt were isolated in the event study, average
abnormal returns were consistently negative between days -4 and 0. The most significant daily
abnormal return was -46 basis points on day -2 with a T-stat of -2.12. This is the day unsecured
debt offerings are usually published in the Wall Street Journal. The -89 basis point CAR for
days -4 to 0 is statistically significant to the 99% confidence interval (CI).
These results provide evidence that the market views an initial shift in REIT capital
structure to include unsecured debt as an unfavorable event. Except for day -2, each of the
negative average abnormal returns on days -4 to 0, in isolation, provides weak evidence of a
negative reaction to unsecured debt IPOs. However, five consecutive days of negative returns
culminating on the day on which the information becomes public are significantly more
convincing. The results suggest that there is a degree of information leakage up until the offering
date.
Examined temporally, the CARs for the IPOs indicate a lessening trend. For the IPO
issues that occurred before 1996, the CAR is -120 basis points with a T-stat of -3.770. The CAR
for the IPO issues after 1995 is -62 basis points with a T-stat of -2.584. This indicates that the
size and significance of the negative reaction to the issuance of unsecured debt by a REIT have
lessened over time as the market for unsecured REIT debt has matured. This lessening of the
abnormal return may be due to an increasing comfort with unsecured debt as part of the capital
structure of REITs by the capital markets and more efficient pricing in the forward-looking
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markets that prices out any abnormal return prior to the issue. The lessening of the abnormal
return could also be a result of the changing real estate cycle over the time period.
Secondary Offerings
When the follow-on issues of unsecured debt were isolated in the event study, average
abnormal returns were consistently positive between days -4 and 0, although none of the daily
abnormal returns were significant to the 95% CI. The 90 basis point CAR for days -4 to 0 was
statistically significant to the 99% CI with a T-stat of +4.902.
As with IPO offerings, each of the average abnormal returns on days -4 to 0, in isolation,
provides weak evidence of a reaction to unsecured debt issues. Five consecutive days of negative
returns culminating the day on which the security is offered, however, are significantly more
convincing. A positive abnormal return indicates that the issue of follow-on debt is viewed
favorably by the market. This positive reaction compared to the negative reaction in IPO issues
may be due to the differing types of information impounded in a follow-on issue. A follow-on
issue does not signal a change in management's capital structure, or introduce new frictions in
the firm. Rather, a follow-on issue provides a reaffirmation of a strategy that was previously put
into place. Also, each unsecured debt issue is separately rated, and most secondary issues receive
the same rating as the previous unsecured debt issue. When this is the case, an additional issue
may provide a signal to the market that the firm is strong enough to handle additional debt, which
may be viewed positively by the markets.
Another plausible argument for the market's positive abnormal reaction to unsecured debt
issuance are the floatation costs to the firm, which are much lower for debt than for equity.
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Underwriting investment grade debt has become a fiercely competitive business and investment
banks now charge less than one percent of the total amount raised for their services. Firms
issuing equity however, generally pay between five and seven percent of the total amount raised
to their financial advisor. This difference can have a significant financial impact.
Finally, the decreased abnormal return for follow-on offerings could be due to the
signaling argument made by Myers and Majluf. Management may be signaling that it has
positive information about the firm's future prospects, and that management is issuing debt
instead of equity in order to retain the upside for the existing stockholders.
Examined temporally, the CARs for the follow-on issues also indicate a lessening trend.
For the secondary issues that occurred before 1996, the CAR was 134 basis points with a T-stat
of +3.603. The CAR for the 26 secondary issues after 1995 was 58 basis points with a T-stat of
+3.127. This indicates that, as with IPO offerings, the size of the reactions to the issuance of
unsecured debt by a REIT have lessened over time as the market for unsecured REIT debt has
matured. As with the declining absolute abnormal return in IPO issues, the declining abnormal
return may be due to an increasing comfort with unsecured debt as part of the capital structure of
REITs by the capital markets. Also, more efficient pricing in the forward-looking markets may
price out any abnormal return prior to the issue.
Consistent with Brealey and Myers23 , the negative market reaction to unsecured debt
IPOs could be a result of the moderate tax disadvantage that tax exempt entities experience by
taking on debt. This particular issue, however, can best be addressed by examining the REIT's
23 Brealey, R.A. and S.C. Myers, 1991, "Principles of Corporate Finance, Fourth Edition," McGraw-Hill Book Co., page 433.
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stated use of funds for offering proceeds. If proceeds from an unsecured debt issue are used to
pay down other debt such as secured or mortgage debt and short-term credit lines, the relative tax
disadvantage of tax-exempt entities should be mitigated. On the other hand, if firms that
experience greater abnormal negative returns are using the proceeds of the debt offering to fund
future expansion, the negative reaction may be due to the relative tax disadvantage of tax-exempt
entities.
The market reaction to an unsecured debt IPO may also be firm related. The reaction may
be to a change in corporate strategy that sends a signal to the market about future growth
opportunities of the firm. Property focus of the firm, the firm's size and age, whether or not the
firm is an UPREIT and financial characteristics of the firm may also explain the abnormal return
in the market.
Finally, the abnormal return may be explained by specific characteristics of the debt being
offered. These characteristics include duration of the debt, the rating of the securities, and any of
a number of bond-covenants that often accompany unsecured debt issues. These bond covenants
include the maximum amount of debt the firm can incur, the maximum amount of secured debt
the firm can incur, the portion of the firm's assets that must be free from secured debt and the
minimum ratio of the firm's net income to its interest expense.
In the next chapter, cumulative average abnormal returns from days -4 to 0 are regressed
against the characteristics of the offerings and the REITs in order to determine those factors that
contribute to the market reaction.
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Chapter 4: Determinants of Negative Abnormal Returns
Overview
In this chapter, we analyze the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) of REITs
that issued unsecured REIT debt in order to determine which factors explain the negative CAR
for initial offerings of unsecured debt and the positive CAR for firms that issue follow-on
offerings.
Data Selection
We begin with the data set developed in Chapter 3. As with the data set in Chapter 3,
firms that timed their debt offerings with dividends between days -4 and 0 were excluded from
the data set. Since the CAR is negative for initial public offerings of unsecured debt and positive
for follow-on issues, the data have been divided in order to be able to provide consistency in the
estimation of the coefficients.
The IPO unsecured data set includes 27 issues that took place between September of 1993
and May of 1997. The follow-on data set includes 40 issues of unsecured debt that occurred
between February of 1994 and June of 1997. The two data sets are summarized in the appendix.
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Characteristics Used in the Regression
Market Value to Book Value Ratio
Market value to book value ratio (MV/BV RATIO) is used as a proxy for a REIT's
market perceived growth prospects. We estimated the market value of a REIT's assets as the
undepreciated book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity
prior to the offering. We assume the market has priced growth potential into the market value of
the equity, whereas it is not included on the firm's balance sheet. The market-to-book value ratio
is the calculated market value of the REIT divided by the undepreciated book value of assets.
Since issuing corporate debt may signal a decrease in future growth opportunities, we expect the
coefficient to be negative for this variable: The more growth impounded in the stock price of the
firm, the greater the negative abnormal return.
Debt Maturity
Myers (1977) argues that the underinvestment problem is a result of a firm's disincentive
to make optimal investment decisions. He argues that a firm can control this potential conflict by
issuing shorter-term debt and by placing restrictive covenants in its indenture agreements.
Moreover, if the debt matures before opportunity to exercise the real-investment options, the
disincentive to invest is eliminated. His argument follows that firms with more growth
opportunities should issue shorter-maturity debt.
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Maturity choice can be a signal concerning the quality of the firm. Howe and Shilling2 4
hypothesize that a firm's choice of short-term debt versus long-term debt provides information to
the market in terms of that firm's long-term growth prospects and financial heath. This is
consistent with the signaling theory developed by and Flannery (1986). The signaling argument
assumes that there is asymmetric information between the firm and the market, which causes
higher quality firms to be undervalued and lower quality firms to be overvalued. While this
results in the mispricing of both long-term and short-term debt, the mispricing of long-term debt
is greater. If the bond market cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality firms,
high-quality firms that are undervalued will want to issue the less underpriced short-term debt.
Low-quality firms that are overvalued will want to issue the more underpriced long-term debt.
Flannery also argues about the signals of future growth opportunities in the firm based on
the selection of long-term or short-term debt. He argues that firms with large potential
information asymmetries, such as high-growth firms, are likely to issue shorter-term debt because
of the larger information costs associated with long-term debt. Firms with smaller potential
information asymmetries should be less concerned with the signaling effects of their debt
maturity choice, and are more likely to issue long-term debt. Since the market knows this, we
expect the coefficient for maturity to be negative with a short-term issue resulting in a positive
reaction from the market, and a long-term issue resulting in a negative reaction from the market.
24 Howe, J.S. and J.D. Shilling. 1988, "Capital Structure Theory and REIT Security Offerings," Journal of Finance, 43, 983-993.
25 Flannery, 1986, "Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," Journal of Finance, 41, 19-37.
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Restrictive Debt Covenants
Three restrictive covenants are examined for each debt offering:
1. The maximum allowable ratio of debt to the undepreciated book value of total assets. This
ratio has a range of 50% to 65%.
2. The minimum ratio of cash flow to the overall interest expense of the firm. This variable
ranges from 1.5 to 2.0.
3. The required multiple of unencumbered real estate assets to be held at any given time by the
REIT. The range for this covenant falls between 0% to 200%.
Smith and Warner (1979) argue that riskier firms benefit from placing more restrictive
covenants in their indenture agreements. These covenants act to reduce both the
underinvestment and asset-substitution agency conflicts that occur after debt is issued. More
restrictive covenants are expected to have a positive effect on average abnormal returns for lower
quality firms and very little effect on high quality firms that do not need covenants to guide
optimal investment behavior. The reduction of the agency frictions between stockholders and
bondholders benefits the bondholder, potentially at the stockholder's expense. Therefore, we
anticipate increasing restrictive covenants to increase the negative abnormal return for IPO debt
issues. Since most follow-on debt issues do not provide for more restrictive covenants that the
unsecured debt in place, we anticipate the effect of the debt-covenants on follow-on issues to be
neutral.
-37-
Yield Curve Environment
Changes in the slope of the yield curve have an effect on the amount of interest-rate risk a
borrower takes when borrowing. In periods when the slope of the yield curve is positive and
high, the difference between interest rates for long- and short-term debt is the greatest, as is
interest-rate risk. Therefore, we anticipate an increase in the slope of the yield curve to have
negative effect on the abnormal return for both IPO and follow-on issues.
UPREIT Status
An UPREIT has two classes of common stockholders, owners of common shares of stock
with a tax-base based on their acquisition of the stock and owners of operating partnership units
(OPUs) that were received in exchange for property now owned by the REIT. OPUs have a tax-
base based on the depreciated purchase price of the real estate contributed to the REIT. There is
an agency conflict between the two kinds of stockholders because holders of OPUs have a
disincentive to sell property that would trigger a tax event. Also, holders of OPUs are generally
closer to the management of the firm and generally have greater control over the firm in practice,
than holders of traditional common stock. Management of an UPREIT may be perceived to be
issuing unsecured debt instead of equity because of its desire to maintain control of the firm,
even if it is in the best interest of the stockholders for the firm to issue equity. Therefore, we
anticipate a greater negative abnormal return for UPREITs than for traditional REITs.
REIT Product Focus
The REIT product focus is modeled with dummy variables. Two property-focus
categories are significant in the analysis, residential, and retail. The higher the sector debt-to-
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market-capitalization ratio, the more the market would react negatively to an unsecured debt
offering. The average debt to market capitalization ratio is highest for retail (43.9%), followed
by residential (40.3%) and lastly office (30.6%)26. The abnormal returns for retail and residential
properties are expected less than for other property types based on this rationale.
Results and Conclusions
Overall, the regression results are promising for the IPO issues, although the R square of
only 56% is somewhat disappointing. The predicted coefficient signs were consistent with the
regression results in all cases. The regression results for the follow-on issues are much less
encouraging and explain only 20% of the abnormal return. It is reasonable and consistent with
theory, however, that the variables that explain the CAR from IPO issues differ from the
variables that explain the CAR from follow-on issues of unsecured debt. IPO issues provide the
market with more new information than follow-on issues, especially the fact that the REIT will
include unsecured debt in its capital structure and the degree to which restrictive debt covenants
will limit the financial flexibility of the REIT. The results of the regressions of the CARs are
summarized in Exhibit 4.
26 Merrill Lynch & Co., 1996, "Comparative Valuation of REITs," April.
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Exhibit 4
Regression Results
IPO Issues Secondary Issues
Independent Variable Coefficient T-Stat Sig-T oefficient T-Stat Sig-T
Market Value to Book Value -0.025594 -1.7670 0.0964 -0.004336 -0.1470 0.8839
Date Index 0.000017 1.1840 0.2535 -0.000006 -0.3190 0.7525
Maturity -0.002702 -1.7910 0.0922 0.000433 0.5230 0.6052
Maximum Debt 0.278102 1.6760 0.1131 -0.116127 -0.3160 0.7541
Minimum Debt Coverage 0.031700 1.1930 0.2502 -0.015787 -0.2320 0.8186
Percent Free 0.014743 1.2110 0.2435 -0.013472 -1.1320 0.2675
Twenty Year minus three month 0.768452 0.8370 0.4148 0.630454 0.5430 0.5912
UPREIT 0.020337 2.2970 0.0355 -0.008483 -0.5830 0.5648
Residential 0.010345 0.9350 0.3636 -0.020876 -1.0280 0.3130
Retail 0.015052 1.2520 0.2287 -0.009765 -0.3470 0.7314
(Constant) -0.235591 -1.5340 0.1446 0.127734 0.4020 0.6908
R-Square 0.5630 0.1959
Market Value to Book Value
The most significant regression variable for the IPO issues is the market-to-book-value
ratio, which supports the hypothesis that a REIT's shift to unsecured debt provides information to
the market concerning firm growth prospects. The higher the ratio prior to the unsecured debt
issue, the greater the market-revision down of the value of the REIT. The market for issuing
unsecured debt, as is indicated by a lower market-to-book-value ratio, imposed less of a penalty
on REITs with relatively low market perceived growth opportunities. Interestingly, the
coefficient for the market-to-book-value ratio variable in the regression of follow-on offerings
also has a negative sign. This too is consistent with theory.
Restrictive Covenants
The maximum allowable debt-to-market-capitalization ratio was the most significant
debt-offering characteristic of the three in the regression. This is a covenant, which decreases in
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the restrictions that it places on the firm as it increases in value. As expected, the coefficient is
negative and lends support to the hypothesis that the additional restrictions on management's
ability to raise debt have a negative impact on the value of equity.
The other two restrictive covenants are less significant in the regression, but have
coefficients contrary to what was anticipated. A plausible explanation for the incongruous sign
on the coefficients for these two variables is that weaker firms need to increase the amount of
debt covenants in their offerings to compete with debt offerings from stronger firms. This
selection bias about firms issuing debt with more restrictions may explain the incongruous signs
from the regression results.
UPREIT Status
The coefficient for the UPREIT status is +0.020 and significant to the 95% CI for IPO
issues. For follow-on issues, the coefficient is -0.008 and insignificant with a T-stat of -0.583.
The positive coefficient for UPREIT status for IPOs is unexpected and discounts the control
argument. One plausible argument is that the UPREITs that issued unsecured debt were larger
and stronger firms for which an issue of unsecured debt provided less information about the firm.
This selection bias may be the reason for the unexpected coefficient sign.
Debt Maturity
Debt maturity, consistent with the results of Howe and Shilling and the signaling theory
presented by Masulis, Dann, Vermaelen, and Diamond, had a negative coefficient of -0.003 with
a T-stat of -1.791. These findings suggest that higher quality firms with greater information
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asymmetries do choose shorter-term debt over longer-term debt. Diamond (1991, 1993) also
suggests the lowest quality firms also, reluctantly, use shorter-term maturity, while middle
quality firms choose longer-term debt.27 The noise from low-quality firms issuing short-term
debt may lower the T-stat of this variable in the analysis.
Exhibit 5
27 Diamond, Douglas W. "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1991, 709-737;
and, "Seniority and Maturity of Debt Contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 193, 341-368.
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Conclusion
The actual and predicted cumulative abnormal returns are plotted on a graph on Exhibit 5.
The results from both the event study results and the regression analysis, support the theory that a
REIT's IPO of unsecured debt provides a signal to the market concerning its future growth
prospects. The market-value-to-book-value ratio, which is used as a proxy for a firm's growth
prospects, is the most significant factor in predicting the market reaction to unsecured debt. The
greater the ratio prior to the unsecured debt issue, the more severe the market revision down of
REIT value. We were not, however, fully able to determine to what extent the market reaction to
unsecured debt IPOs is explained by signaling theory and maturity or as a consequence of the
disadvantage higher debt levels place on tax-exempt firms.
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Chapter 5: Factors that Explain the Pricing of Unsecured REIT Debt
Overview
In this chapter, we analyze which factors explain the pricing of the unsecured-debt
offerings and how the factors have changed over time. There are three major factors that affect
the pricing of debt issued by all firms, including REITs. These are the current interest-rate
environment for risk-free debt, characteristics of the firm that influence the probability that the
firm will repay its debt obligations and characteristics of the debt issue that deal with the agency
conflicts between bond holders and stockholders.
Interest Rate Environment
The primary method for accounting for the influence of the current interest rate
environment on the pricing of REIT debt is by quoting the price of each security in terms of the
spread between the quoted yield of the security and the current yield on risk-free treasury
instruments with the same duration. Additionally, current risk-free interest rates for different
durations may influence the pricing of an issue, so a proxy for the slope of the yield curve has
been used as a variable in the regression analysis as well. As in the previous chapter, this proxy
is the difference between the interest rate on 20-year treasury instruments and the interest rate on
3-month treasury instruments as of the day of the specific issue.
Characteristics of the Firm
Firm-specific characteristics influence both the probability that the firm will repay the
unsecured debt and, to a certain extent, the degree to which agency conflicts exist between
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stockholders and bondholders. These characteristics include the property focus of the REIT, the
age of the REIT, the secured and overall leverage ratios of the REIT, and the UPREIT status of
the firm. Firms that focus on property types that are traditionally more volatile can expect to pay
more for debt capital because higher volatility translates to higher risk for the bondholder without
a corresponding increase in the upside potential of the security. Firms that issue unsecured debt
that have high leverage ratios can also expect to pay more for additional debt capital. As the
portion of the equity claim of the firm decreases and the debt claim on the firm increases, there is
increasing incentive for asset substitution of more risky investments for less risky investments on
the part of management. Also, since the likelihood of financial distress is higher, there is a
higher probability that management will under-invest in positive NPV projects for which
bondholders benefit more than stockholders. 28
Restrictive debt covenants
Since the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1962), capital structure theorists have
discussed the impact of bond covenants on the allocation of risk between bondholders and
stockholders. There appears to be general agreement in the literature. Restrictive covenants help
ensure that the value of the bondholder's position is not eroded by restricting management from
behaving in the interest of stockholders at the expense of bondholders. Without these covenants,
bondholders would require a higher yield. The analysis seeks to determine which covenants are
28 Myers, S. C., 1977, "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics 5, 147-175.
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more valuable to the bondholders and as a result, have a greater impact on the pricing of the
unsecured REIT debt.
Methodology
To analyze the factors that have affected the pricing of fixed-rate unsecured REIT debt at
issuance, multivariate regression analyses are performed. The dependent variable in the
regressions is the fixed-yield spread above U.S. Treasury securities of comparable maturity.
Independent variables selected fall into the three categories identified above: macroeconomic
data, characteristics of the firm, and characteristics of the debt offerings.
Data Selection
As in Chapters 3 and 4, health-care REITs were omitted from the sample because of the
controversy over whether income derived from health-care REITs is from the underlying real
estate or from non-real estate services. Several of the issues in the original sample were priced
based on a variable interest rate, typically floating at a spread to a market index such as the
LIBOR series. Since this analysis seeks to determine pricing of fixed rate debt instruments,
variable-rate issues have also been eliminated from the sample. The original sample also had to
be modified because many of the issues that constituted a single event in Chapter 3 were made up
of multiple traunches of bonds with differing durations. For the pricing analysis, each bond
issued is treated as a separate case. For example, the $130 million issue of Security Capital
Pacific offered on October 16, 1996, contains seven traunches with maturities of 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
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and 30 years. While this constituted a single case in the regression analyses in Chapters 3 and 4,
in the pricing analysis, the issue constitutes seven cases. The sample is summarized in Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6
Issue
Event Security Amt Spread to Event Security Issue Amt Spread to
No. Ticker Issue Date (000s) Treasury IPO? No. Ticker Issue Date (000s) Treasury IPO?
1 FUR 09/24/93 $100.00 352 Yes 49 SCN 05/14/96 $50.00 175 No
2 KIM 09/24/93 $100.00 125 Yes 50 TRI 05/17/96 $100.00 95 Yes
3 PTR 02/01/94 $200.00 120 Yes 51 TRI 05/17/96 $50.00 132 Yes
4 WIR 02/16/94 $50.00 200 No 52 UDR 07/09/96 $125.00 95 No
5 UDR 03/30/94 $75.00 108 Yes 53 SPK 07/17/96 $100.00 121 No
6 TCO 06/22/94 $200.00 120 No 54 SPK 07/17/96 $50.00 95 No
7 UDR 09/20/94 $150.00 100 No 55 CLP 07/18/96 $65.00 95 Yes
8 FRT 01/11/95 $100.00 110 Yes 56 CLP 07/18/96 $65.00 128 Yes
9 WRP 01/23/95 $100.00 165 Yes 57 EQR 08/08/96 $150.00 100 No
10 CPJ 02/23/95 $75.00 165 Yes 58 WRE 08/08/96 $50.00 85 Yes
11 SCN 02/24/95 $50.00 175 Yes 59 WRE 08/08/96 $50.00 95 Yes
12 SCN 02/24/95 $150.00 140 Yes 60 FRT 08/13/96 $50.00 93 No
13 NPR 03/30/95 $100.00 78 Yes 61 PPS 09/25/96 $100.00 71 Yes
14 EQR 04/13/95 $125.00 120 No 62 PPS 09/25/96 $25.00 83 Yes
15 AEC 04/19/95 $75.00 165 Yes 63 PTR 10/16/96 $15.00 52 No
16 SCN 05/09/95 $75.00 135 No 64 PTR 10/16/96 $20.00 65 No
17 SCN 05/09/95 $17.50 100 No 65 PTR 10/16/96 $20.00 70 No
18 SCN 05/09/95 $17.50 105 No 66 PTR 10/16/96 $20.00 75 No
19 SCN 05/09/95 $15.00 95 No 67 PTR 10/16/96 $20.00 78 No
20 DDR 05/10/95 $100.00 145 No 68 PTR 10/16/96 $20.00 83 No
21 NPR 05/31/95 $81.00 70 No 69 PTR 10/16/96 $15.00 42 No
22 MRY 06/20/95 $120.00 118 Yes 70 RET 10/31/96 $55.00 115 No
23 TCO 06/22/95 $100.00 165 No 71 SUS 11/04/96 $100.00 95 Yes
24 WRP 08/21/95 $70.00 140 No 72 CPT 11/14/96 $75.00 101 No
25 WRP 08/21/95 $55.00 110 No 73 OAS 11/20/96 $50.00 80 Yes
26 AVN 09/13/95 $100.00 130 Yes 74 OAS 11/20/96 $50.00 95 Yes
27 DRE 09/19/95 $150.00 130 Yes 75 OAS 11/20/96 $50.00 110 Yes
28 RET 10/27/95 $100.00 160 Yes 76 SPG 11/21/96 $250.00 82 Yes
29 MRY 11/03/95 $40.00 106 No 77 HIW 11/26/96 $100.00 80 No
30 MRY 11/03/95 $40.00 102 No 78 HIW 11/26/96 $110.00 95 No
31 AEC 11/10/95 $10.00 125 No 79 SPK 12/05/96 $100.00 94 No
32 FFA 11/21/95 $50.00 198 Yes 80 SPK 12/05/96 $25.00 135 No
33 FFA 11/21/95 $150.00 150 Yes 81 UDR 01/22/97 $125.00 79 No
34 FRT 12/04/95 $40.00 101 No 82 SCN 01/31/97 $100.00 123 No
35 SPK 12/06/95 $110.00 140 Yes 83 EWR 03/27/97 $75.00 85 Yes
36 SPK 12/06/95 $100.00 120 Yes 84 EWR 03/27/97 $50.00 95 Yes
37 SPK 12/06/95 $50.00 130 Yes 85 PTR 03/27/97 $20.00 83 No
38 SPK 01/19/96 $100.00 147 No 86 PTR 03/27/97 $30.00 110 No
39 CCG 01/23/96 $100.00 250 Yes 87 PPS 03/27/97 $13.00 65 No
40 CPT 02/15/96 $100.00 150 Yes 88 PPS 03/27/97 $37.00 50 No
41 PTR 02/20/96 $50.00 117 No 89 SHU 04/22/97 $50.00 82 Yes
42 PTR 02/20/96 $100.00 145 No 90 SHU 04/22/97 $50.00 71 Yes
43 SKT 03/07/96 $75.00 325 Yes 91 0 05/01/97 $110.00 105 Yes
44 IRT 03/21/96 $50.00 145 Yes 92 FR 05/08/97 $150.00 88 Yes
45 SUI 04/24/96 $65.00 108 Yes 93 FR 05/08/97 $100.00 60 Yes
46 SUI 04/24/96 $85.00 120 Yes 94 SUS 05/29/97 $100.00 120 No
47 SCN 05/14/96 $50.00 90 No 95 RET 06/17/97 $50.00 83 No
48 SCN 05/14/96 $100.001 132 No 96 BRE 06/23/97 $50.00 84 No
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The data include a total of 96 securities, 46 IPO issues and 50 secondary issues. Twenty
of the IPO issues took place before 1996 and 26 took place after 1995. Seventeen of the
secondary issues took place before 1996 and 33 took place after 1995. The issues range in size
from $10 million to $250 million with a mean size of $76.6 million and a median size of $75.0
million. The securities range in their terms to maturity from three to 40 years with a mean term
of 9.9 years and a median term of 8 years.
Variables Used in the Regression and their Expected Coefficient Sign
The following is an explanation of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the
regression and their expected coefficient signs:
Pricing: The dependent variable is calculated by subtracting the yield on the U.S.
Treasury Security of comparable maturity from the yield on the unsecured debt at issuance. The
difference, reported in basis points, is a measure of the market's perception of the risk inherent in
the debt issue. This variable has a value range of 42 bp to 352 basis points in the sample.
Date of Issue: This variable is a daily index with 0 as September 1, 1993. It has been
well documented that in the period of 1993 to 1997, spreads on corporate issues have been
narrowing. Therefore, it is expected that the coefficient will be negative reflecting a downward
trend in spreads over time.
Rating: All of the unsecured debt issues have been rated by both Standard and Poors and
by Moody's. For the regression analysis, both rating agency's ratings have been converted to
numerical values ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 being the worst rating (B2, BB-) and 10 being the
best rating (A2, AA-). The variable used in the regression analysis is a mean rating from the two
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agencies. The ratings for the sample range from 1.5 to 9.5 with a mean rating of 6.1 and a
median rating of 6 (Baa3, BBB+). Because a higher rating indicates a lower risk of default on an
issue, the coefficient from the regression is expected to be negative.
Minimum Debt Coverage Ratio: This variable represents a bond-covenant that limits
the amount of debt that the firm can incur by the ratio of total cash flow to total interest expense.
Since this restriction limits the amount of additional debt that the firm can incur and helps to
prevent the firm from diluting the bondholder's claim from the issue, the coefficient is expected
to be negative.
Market Value to Book Value: The MV/BV variable ranges from 0.91 to 1.83 with a
mean of 1.2 and a median of 1.19. The higher the market value to book value ratio or the more
future growth opportunities that are impounded into the stock price. 29 Because debt secured by
future growth opportunities is riskier than debt secured by assets in place, it is expected that the
coefficient for this variable will be positive.
Portion of Proceeds to Pay Debt: This variable ranges from 0% to 100% and represents
the stated use of the proceeds of the sale of the debt security. Debt that is issued to repay other
debt does not change the leverage ratio of the entire firm, while debt that is issued to fund
operations of the firm increases the leverage ratio of the firm. Increasing the leverage of the firm
would increase the risk of the firm. Therefore, one would expect that the coefficient for this
variable would be negative.
29 Barclay, M. J., and C. W. Smith, Jr., 1995, "The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities," The Journal of Finance, L, 3.
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Percent Free: This variable is a covenant that specifies the minimum ratio of real estate
assets that must remain unencumbered by debt to the outstanding principle of the unsecured debt
issue. This effectively gives the bondholders a first lien position on those assets and assures a
source of collateral that can be mortgaged at the maturity of the bonds. The range of values for
this variable is 0% to 200%, and one would expect a negative coefficient for this variable
because as this variable increases, the loss-risk in the event of default on the bonds decreases.
Yield Curve Index (20yr. - 3mo.): This variable is defined as the difference between
interest rates for the 20 year Treasury Bond and the 3 month Treasury Bill at the time of the
unsecured debt issuance and is a proxy for the slope of the yield curve. This variable has a range
of 0.76% to 3.74% with a mean of 1.77% and a median of 1.84%. The term structure of interest
rates reflects the capital market's expectations about the level of interest rates in the future. If the
yield curve is relatively flat or inverted, borrowers will prefer to lock their cost of capital with
long-term debt; however, lenders will prefer to lend short-term. The opposite is true when the
yield curve is upward sloping. As the slope of the yield curve increases so should the discount.
Issue Amount: The unsecured debt issues vary dramatically in their size from $10
million to $250 million. This variable is included to factor in the size of the bond issue on the
pricing of the debt. It is an examination of the pricing of the bonds based solely on the size of
the bond issues. If the markets are efficient, they should be indifferent to the size of the issue,
unless there are economy-of-scale benefits with larger issues of bonds.
UPREIT Status: Approximately half of the sample was issued by UPREITs and half by
traditional REITs. UPREITs have operating partnership units (OPUs) as well as traditional
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shares of stock in their capital structure, and the holders of OPUs can have agency conflicts with
stockholders as they may be less likely to want to sell assets and incur a capital gains event.
Holders of OPUs are also typically the founders and managers of the UPREIT and may prefer to
issue unsecured debt over additional equity, in order, to not dilute their fraction of equity
ownership, and therefore their control over the firm.
Variables not used in the regression
Data were collected for several variables that were ultimately not used in the final
regression. These variables were rejected either because they were standard to all issues or
because they were statistically insignificant or less significant when included in the regression.
Characteristics that were standard to all issues include:
" All of the REITs were self-administered and managed
e All of the issues paid a semi-annual dividend
" All of the issues were senior unsecured debt
e All of the issues had full call protection
e None of the issues had a sinking fund
" All of the issues had restrictions on merger, consolidation and sale
" All of the issues had requirements for: maintenance of properties, insurance coverage, the
payment of taxes and the furnishing financial information
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Issue characteristics that proved to be statistically insignificant or much less significant
than the variables selected include:
e Change in GDP - % change in GDP over the 12 months preceding the offer date
* Yield 20 yr. - the yield on the 20 year Treasury bond as of the offer date
e Div Limit - a dummy variable representing a covenant that restricts distributions that would
cause a default of any indebtedness
e Type - a dummy variable designed to isolate the dominant property type in the REIT's
portfolio
" Focus - a dummy variable designed to isolate REITs that are both property type and
geographically specific (sharpshooters)
" Fixed cover - the ratio of income available for total fixed charges to total fixed charges
e Net Income / Market Value - ratio of net income before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization to market value of total assets (profitability ratio)
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Results and Conclusions
The sample was divided into IPO offerings and follow-on or secondary offerings and
temporally by pre-1996 and post-1995. The results of the regressions are summarized below in
Exhibit 7.
Exhibit 7
IPO Issues Pre-1996 Issues Post-1995 Issues
Independent Variable Coefficient T-Stat Sig-T Coefficient T-Stat Sig-T
Date of Issue -0.2341 -3.6550 0.0044 -0.1181 -4.4660 0.0005
Average rating (S&P and Moody's) -19.8929 -3.7440 0.0038 -21.4506 -4.6980 0.0003
Minimum Debt Coverage Ratio 31.2970 0.7990 0.4431 -31.3559 -1.1250 0.2796
Market Value to Book Value -41.9144 -1.6010 0.1404 -52.7620 -2.4400 0.0286
Portion of Proceeds to Pay Debt 31.9597 1.0120 0.3353 56.9968 2.6600 0.0186
Percent Mortgage Free 17.6054 1.1050 0.2949 -110.5597 -8.7600 0.0000
Yield Curve Index (20yr. - 3mo.) -3,410.9693 -1.9000 0.0867 8,852.0476 3.8160 0.0019
Issue Amount -0.2818 -1.9240 0.0833 0.1740 1.7480 0.1024
UPREIT status -10.0135 -0.9520 0.3635 -20.6185 -2.1600 0.0486
Intercept 455.5676 5.0020 0.0005 421.8817 6.7960 0.0000
R-Squared 0.9283 0.96517
Secondary Issues Pre-1996 Issues Post-1995 Issues
Independent Variable Coefficient T-Stat Sig-T Coefficient T-Stat Sig-T
Date of Issue 0.1695 1.6130 0.1676 -0.1041 -2.3730 0.0273
Average rating (S&P and Moody's) -10.5243 -2.1690 0.0823 1.5448 0.0940 0.9263
Minimum Debt Coverage Ratio 376.5710 4.9710 0.0042 -10.7707 -0.2280 0.8218
Market Value to Book Value -8.6563 -0.3370 0.7500 -1.6789 -0.0550 0.9563
Portion of Proceeds to Pay Debt 2.6401 0.2530 0.8101 5.4780 0.2610 0.7970
Percent Mortgage Free 22.0756 2.6150 0.0474 18.7630 1.8140 0.0839
Yield Curve Index (20yr. - 3mo.) 238.4448 0.1500 0.8869 -158.1157 -0.0690 0.9457
Issue Amount 0.5283 4.1230 0.0091 0.1052 0.7170 0.4815
UPREIT status 12.4247 1.6420 0.1614 -2.5287 -0.1450 0.8860
Intercept -552.9465 -2.4140 0.0606 202.2575 1.1820 0.2504
R-Squared 0.97873 0.46059
The model does a very good job of explaining the determinants of unsecured debt pricing
of recent IPO issues with an R-Squared of 0.96. The model also does well in explaining the
pricing of earlier issues of unsecured debt. The model performed more poorly in explaining the
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pricing of follow-on issues with fewer significant variables and an R-Squared of only 0.45 for the
more recent issues. This is an interesting finding, however, because it confirms that there is a
significant difference in the way that the initial offering of unsecured debt by a REIT is priced
compared to follow-on offerings. Moreover, more of the same factors explained the pricing of
both IPO and secondary issues earlier in the history of unsecured REIT debt. Perhaps a major
factor in the pricing of more recent secondary REIT debt is the pricing spread of the previous
unsecured debt offering by the same firm. In any case, due to the less significant results of the
model on secondary issues, the focus of this analysis is on the pricing of IPO issues.
The most consistently significant coefficients in the regression are the average rating of
the issue and the time index. As expected, both of these coefficients are negative when
significant at the 90% confidence interval (CI) or better. The negative coefficient for the average
rating reflects the positive impact on pricing that a higher rating has on an issue, and the negative
coefficient for time reflects the narrowing spreads in the broader fixed income market, a trend
that has been occurring especially in the last two years. It is interesting to note that coefficient
for time is negative and significant at the 90% CI for all issues except for follow-on issues before
1996, where the coefficient is positive and significant at the 83% CI. This sign change may
reflect a trend distinct from narrowing spreads in the broader market. The decreasing spreads in
the pricing of IPO issues of unsecured debt in the earlier time period may be due to the market's
acceptance of a new type of security from a firm. The lack of significance over time with follow-
on issues is consistent with this hypothesis because once a firm has unsecured debt in its capital
structure, the issue of a follow-on offering sends less of a signal to the market.
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Another unexpected result of the analysis is the consistently negative coefficient for the
market-to-book-value ratio for both IPO and secondary offerings. One explanation for this
observation is that there may be a selection bias in favor of firms that trade at higher premiums
over book value. Part of the reason the market places a higher premium on firms is the market's
assessment of management's ability to manage the firm more profitably, which translates into the
overall strength of the firm. Therefore, firms with higher premiums in their stock prices may
appear to be lower-risk firms as a result of better management.
The most significant variable in any of the four regressions, with a T-stat of -8.760 is the
minimum percentage of mortgage free assets as a percentage of the debt issue. The coefficient
for this variable is positive and less significant in the other three regressions. This result is
meaningful for two reasons. First, as previously stated, this covenant effectively gives the
unsecured bondholders a first-lien position on a stated dollar value of unencumbered assets. As a
result, this covenant acts to upgrade the unsecured debt to a less-subordinate position. Second,
over time, this covenant has evolved from completely non-existent in unsecured debt indentures
into an almost standard provision in the unsecured debt of REITs. With a coefficient of -110,
and the most typical covenant 200% free, the results indicate that the debt issued by a firm that
lowers the value of this covenant from 200% to 150% in its contract will be penalized by as
much as 55 basis points.
Another change over time is the shift in the price reaction to changes in the yield curve.
Before 1996, increases in the slope of the yield curve resulted in lower prices for the debt-issues.
More recently, however, this trend has changed and increases in the positive slope of the yield
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curve have resulted in higher pricing. It appears that the pricing discount lenders were thought to
have to afford firms issuing long-term debt in a rising interest-rate environment is no longer
necessary. Perhaps this reflects the confidence in the stability of the current interest-rate
environment. It should also be noted that during the period between the first issue and the end of
1995, the slope of the yield curve, indicated by the variable in the regression analysis, had varied
by 300 basis points. During the 18-month period between the end of 1995 and the end of June
1997, the slope of the yield curve has varied by only 94 basis points.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have identified factors that explain most of the pricing of recent IPO
issues of unsecured debt by REITs. Through our analysis, we have also identified shifts in the
market for unsecured REIT debt, both over time and between IPO and follow on offerings. Prior
to 1996, the factors that explained most of the pricing of IPO issues of unsecured debt also
explained the pricing of secondary issues of unsecured debt as well. In the current market, it
appears that pricing of secondary issues of unsecured debt is explained by different factors than
those that explain the pricing of IPO debt. For IPO issues, there are other indications that there
has been a regime-shift in the pricing of unsecured debt by REITs. These include a sign shift in
the coefficient for the Percent Mortgage Free variable, along with a dramatic increase in the
variable's significance and a sign change in the coefficient for the reaction to changes in the
slope of the yield curve.
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Chapter 6: The Debt / Equity Choice for REITs.
Overview
The intent of this analysis is to provide some insight into the reasons why some REITs
issue unsecured debt or equity. Due to the forced 95% payout of net income, the reliance on
retained earnings by REITs to fund growth would be insufficient to fund growth. Therefore there
is a continual reliance on the capital markets for debt and equity financing. It is our hypothesis
that a significant portion of the increase in unsecured debt issuance by REITs can be explained
by the propensity of large firms to acquire capital from all available avenues in the public
markets in order to grow. According to Pecking Order Theory, firms will prefer the use of
retained earnings, followed by debt and then equity for their financing needs.
REITs are tax exempt entities and tax benefits accrued from debt are not available to
REITs. In an imperfect capital market, REIT managers may find arbitrage opportunities between
the cost of equity and debt financing. They may opt to issue a particular security because it is
under-priced by the market. In addition, the capital markets are not entirely frictionless,
elements like floatation costs are significant in the capital structure decision and can impact on
the financing decision by managers30.
30 Masulis, R.W., 1989,'The Debt/Equity Choice', p. 10- 1 1.
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Methodology
The methodology employed here identifies issues pertinent in the debt or equity choice by
REITs'. We have explored variables of capital structure that encourage REITs to issue
unsecured debt, as opposed to accessing equity, for their capital needs. This analysis will involve
a snap shot of explanatory variables in a REIT's capital structure, at calendar year end, prior to
the unsecured debt or equity offering. We hypothesize that due to the dynamic aspects of capital
structure and the real asset cycle, the importance of these variables to the financing decision will
vary with time. The logistic regression analysis has been divided into two separate periods, pre-
1996 and post-1995, thereby, allowing identification of the differences in the significance of
certain aspects in capital structure characteristics over time.
In this study, we will be conducting a logistic regression analysis, accounting for potential
factors specifically related to capital structure, prior to the issuance of unsecured debt or equity.
We denote these factors as independent variables in the regression with respect to the decision to
issue debt. The analysis encompasses only those REITs that have issued equity and/or unsecured
debt from the end of 1993 to the first quarter of 1997. The dependent variable in the regression
is the observation on the unsecured debt issuance (Y=1) or equity issuance (Y=O).
The logistic function in the methodology is:
1Pr[Y =1]= (6)(1 + e~a
where:
Yi = 1 = the observation on the dependent variable.
Yi = 0 = the observation on equity issuance.
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a = constant (intercept) value.
i = parameter modifying X.
X= independent variable.
We regress the decision to issue debt (Y=1) against the independent variables of capital
structure listed below. These explanatory variables are expressed as financial ratios and property
focus types. The scope of this study does not address specific problems related to non-linear
methods, as there are clearly no simple remedies, the errors involved are often sensitive to minor
changes in data processing and model revisions. We believe the margins of error in the study are
not significant between consequent data and model selections.
Sample Construction
A list of REITs with debt and equity offerings for the study period was obtained from
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., SNL and other sources. The list was checked against a list of
unsecured debt and equity issuances from NAREIT. For the study period, 1994 to 1995, a total
of 71 REITs had issued debt or equity, or both. Of this total number there were 16 debt
offerings, and 63 equity offerings. Eight REITs issued both debt and equity.
From 1996 to 1997, 90 REITs issued debt or equity, or both. Of this total, 24 were debt
offerings, and 78 equity offerings. Twelve REITs issued both debt and equity. REIT
characteristics, performance and capital structure data were obtained from the COMPUSTAT
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and SNL databases. Due to general inconsistencies in the data and difficulty in reaching a
complete a database, we have paired down the sample set3 ' in order to maintain integrity.
Independent Variables used in the Logistic Regression Analysis.
Growth: The ratio of market value to book value of assets (MBV) is used in the
regression as a variable controlling for the expected growth opportunities of the firm as perceived
by the market. Growth expectations are assumed to be priced into the firm's market value of
equity. With higher growth opportunities the lower the likelihood of unsecured debt financing,
due to the intangible nature of these opportunities.
Size: To capture the effects of size, measured as the firm's total capitalization, on the
financing decision we have included the variable MCAP into the regression equation. Total
capitalization is the sum of all classes of common stock, total debt, preferred equity, and the
value of UPREIT units. Larger REITs are more likely to issue unsecured debt because of the
externalities generated from size like, reputation and experience.
Leverage: To introduce the effects of leverage we have used the ratio of total debt to
total market capitalization (DDM). REITs that have the highest debt to market capitalization
ratios, like retail REITs, will most likely exhibit a healthy appetite for debt. The debt to total
asset ratio (DET) will be used to further quantify the effect of leverage with respect to the book
value of assets prior to the issuance of debt or equity. We hypothesizes that a highly levered
firm, there is a lower probability it will finance its capital requirements with unsecured debt. The
31 The original sample set consisted of 92 REITs in the first period (1994-1995) and, 101 REITs in the second period (1996-
1997), that had issued debt, equity or both.
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ratio of secured debt to the total assets (ENC) was used to indicate the degree to which assets are
encumbered in the firm. Due to the difficulty in obtaining a true market value of assets, this
variable is only a close proxy for the amount of unencumbered assets in the firm. In this case, the
decision to issue unsecured debt will be affected by the proportion of assets within the firm that
are unencumbered by debt.
Liquidity: In the attempt to introduce the effect of liquidity on the firm's decision to
issue unsecured debt, the ratio of short term debt to the firm's total assets (DAS) and the
coverage ratio (RNI), EBITDA to interest expense, are included as explanatory variables. REITs
may be issuing equity or fixed rate debt to pay-down existing floating rate debt in the short term,
in an attempt to increase firm liquidity. Changes in the interest environment can have a
substantial impact on the firm's short-term liquidity. In addition, the amount of short-term and
long-term debt to total debt (SHT/LON) was used to further quantify firm liquidity. The greater
the proportion of long-term debt to total debt, the greater the predictability of refinancing and
flexibility on the firm's cash flow. We have not incorporated the ability of firms to acquire bank
credit lines to increase short-term liquidity.
Interest Rate Risk: We have introduced the ratio, variable-rate debt to total debt (VAR),
to control for the effect of changes in the interest rate environment on the debt/equity decision.
We predict that higher levels of variable debt within the firm would discourage an issuance of
unsecured debt, provided the proposed debt or equity offering is not used to pay down existing
levels of variable-rate debt.
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Payout Ratio: We have included the variable PAY to capture the effect of dividend
payout to funds from operation on the dependent variable. We anticipate that the continued
pressure to maintain a healthy dividend payout to existing stockholders will impact on the
decision to issue unsecured debt3 2 . An unsecured debt issuance is an additional obligation on the
firm's cash flow. The variable DIR is used to control for the effects of having a dividend
reinvestment policy in place by REITs.
Property Focus: We have introduced the variables HLT (Healthcare), HOT (Hotel), IND
(Industrial), OFF (Office), RES (Multi-Family), RET (Retail), and STO (Storage). Different
property types generate differing levels of cash flow. Therefore, the level of existing debt can be
explained by the various property types ability to generate cash flow. For example, apartment
REITs may be prepared to increase the debt levels in the firm due to their low correlation to the
business cycle and their ability to obtain tax-exempt debt. We have introduced the variable
(DIV) to include the effects of diversification on the decision to issue unsecured debt. The
benefits of diversification allow firms to reduce the volatility of cash flow from regional and
property-specific issues. Unsecured debt issuances should be positively correlated to
diversification effects.
Performance: We have used the FFO earnings multiple (FFO) to measure the
performance of the firm in the year leading up to the issuance of debt. Here we believe that
32 Masulis (1989) has argued that there exists an interdependence between the firm's financing, investments and dividend
decisions.
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companies which have a performance advantage over others, reflected in the FFO earnings
multiple, have better access to the debt markets.
Ownership Structure: The UPR variable has been used to identify REITs that have been
formed in an UPREIT structure and its influence on the dependent variable. An UPREIT is a
REIT created through a group of individuals contributing existing properties in return for
operating partnership shares (OPU). This gives individuals an opportunity to reposition existing
assets, which have been depreciated to a point where a sale would initiate a large capital gain.
The variable OPU will attempt to quantify the effects of inside ownership on the firm
decision to issue unsecured debt. OPU is the percentage of operating partnership units to the
total number of shares. Due to the restrictions on the ownership of fifty percent of the firm to five
or fewer, we believe that the effects of corporate control and ownership will be weighted into the
firm's financing decision.
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Results and Conclusions
Study Period 1 (1994-1995)
Exhibit 8
Logistic Multivariate Regression - Explanatory variables for unsecured debt
issuances by REITs, for the period 1994 through to 1995.
PRE - 1996
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Age since IPO AGE 0.000326 0.000139 2.348627 0.022
Total Debt to Market Cap DDM -0.059613 0.033055 -1.80344 0.0761
Market to Book Value MBV -0.020299 0.012712 -1.596877 0.1153
Total Market Capitalization MCAP 0.001666 0.000692 2.408397 0.019
UPREIT status UPR -1.652639 0.789329 -2.093728 0.0403
Long-Term Debt to Total Debt LON 0.029953 0.017468 1.714739 0.0913
EBITDA to Interest Expense RNI -0.06949 0.058958 -1.178632 0.243
Exhibit 10 shows the results of the logistic regression and the variables that appeared
significant for the period from 1994 through 1995. The variables that appeared significant at the
95% confidence interval (CI) were AGE, MCAP and UPR. Adjusting for a confidence level of
90%, the variables DDM and LON are significant. In addition, the variable MBV appeared
significant at the 85% CI. The variables FFO and OPU were excluded from both sets of
regression equations for both periods. It appears that the effects of these variables were picked
up by the remaining set. To establish the robustness of our findings for both periods, we had
estimated two separate equations using various combinations of the independent variables (see
Appendix 5).
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Study Period 2 (1996-1997)
Exhibit 9
Logistic Multivariate Regression - Explanatory variables for unsecured debt
issuances by REITs, for the period 1996 through 1997.
POST - 1995
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Total Debt to Market Cap DDM 0.061871 0.032002 1.933368 0.0565
Secured Debt to Total Assets ENC -0.068061 0.019561 -3.479504 0.0008
Market to Book Value MBV 0.027822 0.012979 2.143648 0.0349
Total Market Capitalization MCAP 0.000867 0.000383 2.26634 0.026
Exhibit 11 above shows the results of the logistic regression and the variables that
appeared significant for the period from 1996 through 1997. For a 95% confidence interval,
ENC, MBV and MCAP are significant. Adjusting for a confidence level of 90%, the variable
DDM, was significant.
Leverage
The DDM variable was not significant in the study period from 1994 through to 1995,
with a T-stat of -1.803 and coefficient of -0.059. We included the DDM variable in the final
results because it provides an insight into the impact of firm leverage on the debt/equity decision.
An increase in the debt to total market capitalization results in the lower likelihood of an
unsecured debt issuance. This is not surprising because the increase in the DDM ratio reflects an
increase in firm leverage. An increase in firm leverage appears to impact negatively on the
probability of unsecured debt IPO issues in the period pre-1996. The general significance of
leverage ratios in the decision to issue debt over equity during the period of the IPO boom,
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indicates that the capital markets appeared to be discouraging REITs from levering up for the
first time with unsecured debt.
In the later period of study from 1996 to 1997, the DDM variable was significant at the
90% CI. The ratio had a T-stat of +1.933 and coefficient of +0.062. The positive coefficient
indicates that REITs were being encouraged to lever up with unsecured debt. The change in the
sign of the coefficient is important because it supports our hypothesis that a regime shift in the
capital markets with the use of leverage by REITs has taken place. This regime shift could have
been driven by a combination of factors, like the resurgence of private capital, a lower cost of
debt or possibly differences in the floatation costs between debt and equity. During this period a
higher proportion of the unsecured debt issuances were follow-ons. Therefore an increased
familiarity with the use of unsecured debt, by both REITs and the capital markets, may have
fuelled the appetite for this form of debt.
The ENC variable was significant in the period post-1995, with a T-stat of -3.479 and
coefficient of -0.068. This variable is a proxy for the amount of encumbered assets in a REIT.
The larger the proportion of encumbrance with debt, the less likely the issuance of unsecured
debt. This is reflected in the negative coefficient for ENC. We believe that the lower the
proportion of unencumbered assets in a firm, the lower its creditworthiness and ability to service
additional debt obligations. This ratio was not significant in the period pre-1996, although the
negative coefficient was consistent across both periods.
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Growth
The MBV variable appeared significant at the 85% confidence interval for the period pre-
1996. The variable had a T-stat of -1.597 and coefficient of -0.02. This variable was used to
account for the growth expectations of the firm. We have assumed that the market has priced any
growth expectations into the market value of equity. For the period pre-1996, the negative
coefficient indicates that REITs with significant growth potential are less likely to issue
unsecured debt as a capital source. In general, high growth firms have assets that are much less
tangible and, as such, are more difficult to finance with debt. This is also an indication that the
market has discouraged the use of unsecured debt by REITs as a capital source for growth.
The MBV variable had a T-stat of +2.144 and a coefficient of +0.027 for the period post-
1995. The positive coefficient indicates that with an increase in the growth prospects of the firm
the more likely an issuance of unsecured debt will take place. The change in sign of the
coefficient, from negative in pre-1996 to positive for post-1995, is again indicative of the regime
shift that has taken place in the capital markets for REITs to lever-up with unsecured debt. It
appears that the public markets are now in effect encouraging this form of debt as a capital
source for growth. The combination of increased competition from a resurgence of private
capital and the familiarity with this form of debt has contributed to its lower cost and increased
use by firms in post-1995.
Liquidity
The LON variable was significant in the period pre-1996 at the 90% CI. The variable had
a T-stat of +1.715 and coefficient of +0.029. The higher the proportions of long term debt in the
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firm, the higher the likelihood of an unsecured debt issuance by a REIT. This seems plausible
from two aspects: first, refinancing costs are incurred infrequently with long term debt, providing
a greater degree of predictability, allowing firms to better manage any additional debt obligations
on its cash flows. Secondly, with the higher proportions of long-term debt within firms there
seems to be a trend in refinancing with short-term debt 33. Although the variable DAS did not
show up significant in pre-1996, the coefficient of -0.130 in the first regression equation (see
Appendix 6), would seem to indicate that with a higher proportion of short-term debt, a REIT
was less likely to issue unsecured debt. This reinforces the hypothesis with respect to the
predictability in refinancing34 and the degree to which a REIT was levered with long-term debt.
The positive coefficient for the variable DAS in the period post-1995, could be a result of an
increasing comfort with the higher debt levels in REITs by the public markets.
The variable RNI had a T-stat of -1.179 and coefficient of -0.069. This negative
coefficient appears contradictory to the notion that a higher coverage ratio better enables the firm
to meet its debt obligations. We believe the market was concerned with a policy of high-payout
ratios in the early nineties. This is clearly evident in the time series analysis of payout ratios by
REITs in chapter 7. The combination of higher EBITDA and lower interest expense, allowed
REITs to make and maintain higher payouts to investors in the period pre-1996. Therefore with
higher payouts firms are less likely to take on unsecured debt obligations.
33 Maturity choice by firms can be a signal concerning the quality of the firm. See Howe and Shilling (1988). Flannery (1986)
had also argued that due to asymmetric information, higher quality firms tend to be undervalued and will, consequently issue
underpriced short-term debt. In addition, refinancing from long to short term debt is also indicative of the ability of these firms
to access capital through bank-lines.
3 Higher proportions of short-term debt exposes the firm to higher interest rate risks.
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Age
The AGE variable is representative of the age of a REIT from IPO up to the issuance of
debt or equity. This variable appeared significant at the 95% CI for the period pre-1996, with a
T-stat of +2.349 and coefficient of +0.0003. The positive coefficient indicates that mature
REITs are more likely to issue debt for the period pre-1996. It appears that, the relatively new
debt instrument was best left to REITs that had some degree of operating experience or cash flow
stability. This observation is not significant in the later period of the study, which tells us that
the market was not perturbed with unsecured debt issuance by less mature REITs, or the fact that
a majority of issuances were typically follow-on offerings. This is reflective of the general
maturation of the market with respect to unsecured debt between 1994 and 1997. This variable
has reinforced the notion of a regime shift in the preferences of the capital markets and REITs for
debt.
Ownership
The UPREIT structure makes a REIT less likely to issue unsecured debt. This variable
appeared significant at the 95% CI for the study period from 1994 through to 1995, with a T-stat
of -2.094 and coefficient of -1.653. The contributed properties contained within the REIT
cannot be sold without initiating a capital gains tax liability to the investors whom have
exchanged properties for OPUs. For this reason the UPREIT is not able to take advantage of a
primary benefit of unsecured debt, which is the flexibility to dispose of assets without having to
adjust the asset-specific financing. If the properties are not sold there is no reason not to finance
them with traditional secured mortgages. The UPR variable is not significant for the later period
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of study but has, interestingly, a positive coefficient. As touched upon in the literature review,
the issuance of debt does not dilute control of the firm, like equity, and therefore benefits the
existing shareholders. Therefore the issuance of unsecured debt can be beneficial to the OPU
holders of an UPREIT structure by not diluting their control.
Conclusion
The interesting result from the logistic regressions, is the evidence of a regime shift in the
preferences of REITs and the capital markets. It appears that REITs were being encouraged to
increase leverage by the capital markets during the latter study period from 1996 through 1997.
The leverage ratio, of debt to total market capitalization, has increased from an average of
31.57%, for the period pre-1996, to the current level of 37.63% (see Exhibit 13). This represents
a considerable increase in the debt levels, relative to the growth in the market value of equity, for
most REITs during the study period.
The effects of leverage are always weighted in a firm's financing decision and, for the
period pre-1996, did appear significant in the decision to issue unsecured debt by REITs. We
believe this was a good indication of the public markets inexperience with the use of unsecured
debt by REITs, which had only taken off in early 1993. Under trade-off theory3 5 , the firm must
weigh the costs of financial distress against benefits derived from tax shields. REITs are tax
exempt but the costs of financial distress are always pertinent to the decision to issue debt.
3 Brealey and Myers, "The Principles of Corporate Finance." 4th Ed., 1991, McGraw Hill Book Company.
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The regime shift in the unsecured debt or equity choice by REITs is probably due to
several factors. First, the lower growth opportunities36 as perceived by the market, mean that
debt financing was more readily available to REITs. The change in the average market-to-book
value for firms during this period, from 141.53% to 135.04%, confirms a change in the growth
opportunities of REITs. Secondly, market optimism for REITs in the latter period of the study,
was reflected in considerably higher FFO earnings multiples and growing market capitalization.
In this scenario, optimal investment behavior from management would be to issue equity when
the firm's stock is overpriced. This concurs with the observation of a record $11.5 billion in
completed secondary offerings from REITs in 199637. Together with the growing value of equity
within the firm was an ability to increase the amount of debt, while maintaining comfortable debt
to equity ratios over this period of change. Finally, the availability of financing options had
grown for REITs because of the resurgence of private capital in the marketplace.
With this shift in the preferences of the capital markets, we believe there is a clear trend
in the increases in leverage by REITs during the study period. Studies have also shown that a
firm's leverage ratio is positively related to the average leverage ratio in its industry, and that
firms make capital structure decisions with long-term target leverage ratios in mind. The trend in
the increased use of unsecured debt by REITs seems consistent with lower growth opportunities,
38
where the more tangible the firm's assets are the greater the leverage . Increases in leverage
36 Financing growth opportunities with debt or equity is tied directly to the tangible nature of the firm's assets. High growth
companies are often associated with less tangible assets.
3 Source NAREIT.
38 Titman and Wessels (1984) find that tangible assets are positively related to firm leverage.
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with the continued use of unsecured debt by REITs will be tempered by the cost of debt to the
firm, in order to compensate lenders for the higher default risk.
Exhibit 10
Summary Statistics for the Distribution of Financial Ratios for All REITs
from 1994 through 1997.
PRE - 1996 POST - 1995
Standard Standard
Independent Variable Mean Median Deviation Mean Median Deviation
DDM Debt to Market Cap 31.57% 32.54% 17.68% 37.63% 38.34% 15.98%
DET Debt to Total Assets 40.95% 41.56% 21.65% 47.65% 45.92% 19.18%
MBV Market to Book Value 141.53% 135.85% 35.65% 135.04% 129.02% 32.01%
SHT Short-Term Debt to Total Debt 12.94% 1.71% 24.98% 11.71% 2.27% 23.61%
ENC Secured Debt to Total Debt 28.01% 29.58% 22.77% 32.16% 32.83% 22.20%
LON Long-Term Debt to Total Debt 81.75% 97.69% 30.56% 80.46% 90.56% 27.20%
VAR Variable-Rate Debt to Total Debt 40.55% 35.85% 34.39% 47.65% 45.92% 19.18%
RNI EBITDA to Interest Expense 8.61 4.01 14.19 6.78 3.54 14.07
MCAP Total Market Capitalization 621.61 513.64 563.84 776.57 676.84 596.50
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Chapter 7: An Examination of the Trends in REIT Dividend Policy.
Overview
The distribution of dividends is a mechanism for the transferring of resources to
stockholders. The regulated 95% payout of net income, was designed to ensure this transfer of
resources took place and was a by-product of the distrust investors had for real estate operating
companies in behaving sub-optimally. The sustainability of high payout ratios from REITs
hinges on firm performance and may have a direct effect on the investment and financing
decisions of REITs. In addition, the effects of macroeconomic factors on the operating
performance of REITs can be quite compelling, as real estate tends to move in cycles with local,
regional and national economies. An examination of the trend in payout ratios over the study
period will provide a clearer picture of the evolution and effects of REIT dividend policy over
time.
Methodology
To examine the changes in REIT dividend policy, we have observed the trends in the
payout ratios for most REITs during the study period 1990 through 1997. The dividend payout
requirements from REITs are measured to net income, as defined under Generally Accepted
Accounting Procedures (GAAP). The definitional problem with net income under GAAP is that
depreciation is treated as an accounting expense. This distorts the picture of the operating
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performance of a real estate operating company. This section of the paper involves a time series
analysis of quarterly dividends and payout ratios calculated as a percentage of funds from
operation (FFO). 39 The analysis has been repeated for the different REIT property-focus types.
The sample includes 164 REITs, and a bias within the sample exists because of the larger
proportion of retail and multi-family REITs in the early 1990's. Therefore the observations for
the study period from 1990 through 1997, are not entirely representative of the trend in all
REITs. We have mitigated this discrepancy by analyzing trends in dividend policy for all
property types from 1994 through 1997.
Time Series Analysis
For the sample of REITs during the period 1990 through 1997, the average payout ratios,
which are expressed as a percentage of FFO, have been gradually declining with time (see
Exhibit 11). The peak in the payout ratios occurred around the beginning of the IPO boom in the
early 1990s.4' This was a function of the required payout of 95% of net income by REITs and the
need to entice investors to this form of investment with attractive dividend yields. The payout
trend to net income mirrors the trend in payout to FFO.
39 The restated FFO figures were obtained directly from COMPUSTAT and SNL. Restated FFO is related to the definitional
changes made to FFO and its calculation by NAREIT in 1995.
40 Due to the difficulty in obtaining data for a complete database, we have removed several data-points from our original REIT
universe of 198.
41 To arrive at a FFO figure we would have to add back depreciation and exclude the gain on sale figures from net income.
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The peak in the early nineties was also due in part to the large growth opportunities,
through acquisitions, in the wake of the real estate depression of the late eighties. This in
combination with the flow of capital from the public markets allowed REITs to pursue a
'positive-spread investing' strategy 42. Following this course of events, the REIT market saw the
beginnings of an IPO boom in 1994.
Exhibit 11
Quarterly Payout Ratio
ALL REIT from 1990:1 through 1997:1
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Payout ratios have leveled off since the first quarter of 1994 and have remained relatively
flat. Increasing the level of retained earnings appears to be high on a REIT manager's list of
objectives. Reduced payout ratios lessen the continual reliance by REITs on the capital markets
for capital, and higher levels of retained earnings can provide greater flexibility with changes in
42 Positive-spread investing refers to the ability to obtain financing at a cost far less than the returns generated by acquisitions.
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capital expenditure brought about by increased market-volatility due to macroeconomic factors of
supply and demand, without the use of short-term debt.
Exhibit 12
Statistical Summary of the Distribution of the Percentage Change in the Payout Ratios for the Period 1990
through 1997
Standard
Property Focus Mean Median Deviation Maximum Minimum Range Skew Slope*
Retail 100.57% 89.05% 21.38% 147.77% 73.86% 73.91% 0.94 -2.15
Diversified 92.95% 86.01% 18.04% 150.31% 75.09% 75.22% 1.92 -1.14
Industrial 88.77% 83.32% 17.34% 143.59% 71.52% 72.07% 2.44 -1.57
Health 87.72% 88.94% 4.56% 104.57% 83.33% 21.24% 1.85 -0.03
Multi Family 85.28% 84.11% 9.70% 113.43% 73.17% 40.26% 1.51 -0.79
Storage 79.19% 76.55% 15.99% 111.55% 44.00% 67.55% 0.07 1.36
Hotel 77.19% 75.57% 9.11% 92.79% 63.76% 29.03% 0.42 0.06
Office 74.07% 78.08% 12.29% 87.50% 40.00% 47.50% -1.49 -1.07
*Calculated slopes from trend lines.
Exhibit 13
Quarterly Payout Ratio
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The trend in the payout ratios of retail REITs in Exhibit 13, mirrors the observations for
all REITs, with an increase around the initial spurt of IPOs, followed by a gradual decline since
1992. The mean payout ratio over the period, 1990 to 1997, was 100.57% with a standard
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deviation of 21.38% (see Exhibit 12). It must be noted that the payout ratios over and above
100% of FFO are an unusual observation. We believe that this could be due to the distribution of
higher dividends from the proceeds of the gain on sale of assets.
Exhibit 14
Quarterly Payout Ratios
Retail REITs from 1994:1 through 1997:1
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Payout ratios for retail REITs have leveled off since 1994, with a mean of 84.66% and
standard deviation of 4.09% (see Exhibit 22). Retail REITs have been able to maintain a high
payout ratio because of their ability to generate a relatively stable cash flow. Stable cash flows
were a result of a combination of factors. The common use of triple net leases in retail tends to
cover capital expenditures related to tenant improvements (TIs). In addition, tenant migration in
retail tends to be considerably lower than those observed in other property types.
In the multi-family sector, the trend of declining payout ratios over the study period is
similar to that observed in most other property types. The dramatic drop in the payout ratio, in
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the fourth quarter of 1992, coincides with an increase in U.S. apartment vacancy rates43 . The
mean payout ratio was 85.28% with a standard deviation of 9.7% for the period 1990 through
1997. The relatively higher payout ratios over the study period may be due to the lower volatility
in multi-family REIT cash flows. Multi-family REITs can generally sustain a high dividend
policy, because demand is relatively stable over the business cycle and TI expenditures are low in
comparison to other property types. Presently, lower vacancy rates and stable cash flows in the
apartment sector are reflected in a relatively stable payout ratio (see Exhibit 15).
Exhibit 15
Quarterly Payout Ratio
Multi Family REITs from 1994:1 through 1997:1
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While the forced 95% payout to net income can restrict a REITs ability to retain earnings,
market fundamentals can affect dividend policy for different property types. For example, in the
office market, high TI requirements can prove the bane of a low retained-earnings policy. Supply
and demand conditions can create situations of increased tenant migration and result in large up-
4 Equitable Research, 1997.
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front TI expenditures. In addition, difficulty in obtaining financing to meet these expenditures
can force revisions of a firm's dividend policy. Property types like hotel and office are notorious
for having high capital expenditures.
Exhibit 16
Quarterly Payout Ratio
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The payout ratios of office REITs for the study period indicate a trend of decreasing
payout to FFO (see Exhibit 16). Although, U.S. office vacancy rates have been gradually
decreasing since 1994. The growth opportunities from acquisitions appear to be shrinking and
payout ratios have mirrored this decline. The volatility of cash flows around a time of increased
occupancy and up-front expenditures have also contributed to this observed trend in office REIT
dividend policy. The mean payout ratio for office REITs was 76.39% with a standard deviation
of 7.51% for the period 1994 through first quarter 1997.
Hotel REITs have been maintaining a payout trend that appears to be relatively flat but
volatile. This volatility appears to be triggered by seasonality, shorter lease terms, and higher
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capital expenditure commonly experienced in the hotel industry (see Exhibit 17). The mean
payout ratio was a low 77.19%, second only to office REITs, with a standard deviation of 9.11%.
Exhibit 17
Quarterly Payout Ratio
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The current round of development activity in the hotel industry will have interesting
implications for hotel REIT dividend policy. Hotel REITs in themselves are a new property type,
having only been around since the beginning of 1994.
A picture of declining payouts from industrial REITs is again evident (see Exhibit 18).
The average payout ratio for the study period 1994 through 1997 was 83.69% with a standard
deviation of 7.87%. The relatively high average payout to FFO is indicative of low volatility in
cash flow and low TI in this property type. This is attributable to the nature of industrial lease
contracts.
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Exhibit 18
Quarterly Payout Ratio
Industrial REITs from 1994:1 through 1997:1
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Exhibit 19
Quarterly Payout Ratio
Diversified REITs from 1994:1 through 1997:1
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The argument that the volatility of cash flows from REITs is correlated with the payout
ratio is quite persuasive, especially when examining the trends in the diversified sector of the
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industry. From Exhibit 19 it is evident that the benefits of diversification are evident in the
dividend policy of diversified REITs. Cash flow patterns exhibit little volatility, which has
manifested itself in higher payout ratios for the study period. For the period 1990 through 1997,
the mean payout ratio was 92.95%, second only to retail. In the second period from 1994
through 1997 the payout ratios from diversified REITs was second only to healthcare.
Exhibit 20
Quarterly Payout Ratio
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Healthcare REITs exhibit the flattest trend line of all the property types. This is due to
the low volatility in their cash flows. In general, these REITs do not operate any of their
properties, which results in extremely low overhead. Properties in a healthcare REIT are
originally purchased and subsequently leased back to healthcare operators. The REIT receives
revenue from the lease payments or, if mortgage financed, interest payments from the mortgagee.
There is also the ability to participate in the up-side of increasing revenues.
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Interestingly, storage REITs exhibits the steepest increase in payout ratios for all property
types. The payout ratio has steadily climbed since the beginning of 1994. This is an indication
of a general recovery in rental rates and occupancies since the overbuilding of the late-eighties.
The volatility in the payout ratios is also reflective of volatility in the underlying cash flows and
could be a result of the uncertainty in the next phase of development in the storage market.
Exhibit 21
Quarterly Payout Ratio
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Exhibit 22
Statistical Summary of the Distribution of the Percentage Change in the
Payout Ratios for the Period 1994 through 1997
Standard
Property Focus Mean Median Deviation Maximum Minimum Range Skew Slope*
Health 89.61% 88.47% 4.89% 104.57% 84.74% 19.83% -2.7 -0.26
Diversified 88.19% 85.93% 6.46% 101.83% 79.59% 22.24% 0.92 0.04
Retail 84.66% 86.03% 4.09% 89.62% 73.86% 15.76% -1.54 -0.8
Industrial 83.69% 83.22% 7.87% 95.40% 71.52% 23.88% 0.22 -1.57
Multi Family 82.38% 83.03% 4.26% 88.16% 73.17% 14.99% -0.75 -0.08
Storage 79.19% 76.55% 15.99% 111.55% 44.00% 67.55% 0.07 1.36
Hotel 77.19% 75.57% 9.11% 92.79% 63.76% 29.03% 0.42 0.06
Office 76.39% 75.57% 7.51% 87.50% 64.69% 22.81% -0.26 -1.21
*Calculated slopes from trend lines.
-83-
Conclusion
There is a clear trend of decreasing payout ratios in almost all property sectors for the
study period 1990 through 1997. It should be noted that the sample population contains a larger
proportion of retail and multi-family REITs going back to the early nineties. Exhibit 22 provides
a statistical summary of the payout ratios for all REITs in the study post-1993. The trends during
this period provide a picture of relatively stable payout ratios across all property types.
Manifested in these payout trends are indications of lowering growth opportunities and the
normalization of the industry from the IPO booms of years past.
Exhibit 23
Quarterly Payout Ratio
REITs (Unsecured Debt) from 1994:1 through 1997:1
110
105 -
0 100 -
LL
IL
' 95 -
c
-0 90
y =0.4139 x + 8 6.359
85 
- ------ 
- - - - - - -. . .
cu 80
0 75
C1
0 70
It1 L0 U) 0 It0 U) CD CD (0 6
M) M) 0 ) 0 0) 0D 0) M) M 0) 0) M)
The payout ratios for all REITs that have issued unsecured debt since 1993 have
exhibited a slight downward trend from 1994 (see Exhibit 23). The reasonably low volatility in
the average payout ratios of REITs that have issued unsecured debt can be explained by the
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predominance of property types with cash flow stability like, residential, retail and industrial (see
Exhibit 24).
Exhibit 24
Unsecured Debt Issuance By Property Type
from 1993 through 1997
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It would appear from the analysis, the shift in the preferences of the public markets have,
to some extent driven REIT dividend policy. Changes in the future growth opportunities and the
capital sources made available to REITs have been identified as reasons for this shift. The
declining trend in the average payout ratios, which resulted in flatter dividend yields, was
possibly an indication that the public markets had tempered the pressure to maintain high payouts
to FFO with signals of lower future growth opportunities. Coupled with this was the desire to
boost returns from REIT investments with the use of debt. The observed leverage increases (see
Exhibit 10) as a result of this shift, have yet to produce an offsetting change in REIT dividend
policy over the latter period of the study.
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Chapter 8: The Determinants of REIT Dividend Policy.
Overview
A firm's dividend and financing policies are ultimately linked to its cash flow constraints.
This assumes that given a change in current earnings, or a change in financing, an offsetting
change in dividend policy would be expected from the firm. Increases in debt financing could
cause a change in dividend policy by REITs because additional interest obligations on the firm's
cash flow could reduce the flexibility in meeting its current payout policy. The required dividend
payout, of 95% of net income, has limited REITs' ability to retain capital for funding.
Reinvestment of firm's earnings is an important means for increasing available capital, as
opposed to offering new equity or debt claims. In addition, the differences in the cost of internal
and external financing have implications for future investment decisions. The exclusion of
depreciation and inclusion of the gains on sale from real estate in net income, under GAAP
provides an unclear picture as to the true performance of a REIT.
Methodology
This part of the paper involves modeling the payout ratios for REITs that have issued debt
or equity for the study period 1990 through to 1997, thereby allowing us to identify firm
characteristics that determine the distribution of earnings from REITs. We have used an ordinary
least squared (OLS) multivariate regression analysis to model the payout ratios (Equation 7).
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Y=ac+PIX 1+f 2X 2 '''n3n X,+e (7)
where:
Y = the observation on the dependent variable = payout ratio.
a= constant (intercept) value,
Pn= parameter modifying Xn,
Xn= independent variables, and
E =error term.
The dependent variables are the observation on the payout ratios for the two separate time
periods, pre-1996 and post-1995. XI.. .X is the observation on the independent variables for the
sample population.
Sample Construction
A list of the REIT universe for the period 1990 through the first quarter of 1997 was
obtained from various industry sources. Quarterly dividend and FF0 44 information was obtained
from databases prepared by COMPUSTAT and SNL. We have excluded some REITs from the
sample set due to the difficulty in obtaining consistent information for the observation period.
For the period pre-1996 and post-1995, the samples contain 70 and 90 REITs respectively.
4 FFO figures have been restated to conform to the redefinition of FFO by NAREIT in 1995.
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Independent Variables used in the OLS Regression Analyses.
The independent variables introduced in the OLS regressions are similar to those used in
the logit regression model in chapter 6. We have used several firm-specific characteristics to
formulate a model of REIT dividend policy. These characteristics have been expressly chosen
for their effects on the firm's cash flow available for distribution.
Results and Conclusions
Study Period (1994 - 1995)
Exhibit 25
OLS Multivariate Regression results:
Study period from 1994 through 1995.
PRE - 1996
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Short-Term Debt to Total Assets DAS 0.70499 0.42310 1.66626 0.10050
Total Debt to Market Cap DDM -0.40662 0.23147 -1.75668 0.08370
Total Market Cap MCAP 0.02464 0.00717 3.43655 0.00100
Variable Rate Debt to Total Debt VAR -0.18977 0.12213 -1.55379 0.12510
R-Square 0.1255
We have included the results from the OLS regression (Exhibit 25), which do not include
variables that were not significant to an 85% CI. A second equation with a complete list of all
explanatory variables has been included in the appendix. The R-Square of 0.1255 is indicative of
the difficulty we had in modeling the payout policy of REITs.
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The variable MCAP is significant at the 95% confidence interval (CI). The MCAP
variable is the total market capitalization of the firm, and provides an indication of the impact of
size on the payout ratio. This variable had a T-stat of +3.437 and coefficient of +0.025, which
indicates that a larger firm is likely to have a higher payout to funds from operation (FFO). A
10% increase in the size of the REIT in terms of market capitalization would predict a
corresponding increase of 2.5% in the payout ratio. Larger REITs will generally have better
access to equity capital, and the ability to leverage it by taking on additional debt. The public
market believes that these firms are then able to acquire assets and ultimately grow FFO. The
DDM variable has been used in the model to include the effects of leverage. This ratio had a T-
stat of -1.757 and coefficient of -0.407. This is consistent with the general notion that greater
leverage within the firm results in higher interest expenses, which are an additional obligation on
the firm's cash flow. The predicted negative relationship between leverage and payout ratio is
not particularly controversial.
The DAS variable is the short-term debt to total assets, with a T-stat of +1.666 and
coefficient of +0.705. From the OLS regression, an increase in DAS would indicate a positive
change in the payout ratio for the period 1994 through 1997. This ratio has been used to control
for the effect of liquidity with respect to assets on the payout from REITs. We believe firms that
have a higher proportion of short-term debt are signaling their higher quality and ability to
45
maintain healthy payout ratios
4 This is consistent with the argument that higher quality firms will issue short-term debt as a signal of its quality. See Flannery
(1986).
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The variable VAR was significant at the 85% CI, with a T-stat of -1.554 and coefficient
of -0.189. VAR is the amount of variable-rate debt to total debt and is negatively correlated to
the payout ratio of the firm. The model indicates that a 10% increase in the amount of variable-
rate debt would result in a 19% drop in the payout ratio. This is consistent with the general
perception that managers are unable to distribute high dividends because of the lower
predictability of refinancing associated with variable-rate debt. Surprisingly other variables, like
RNI46 and SHT47 that were introduced into the model to include liquidity characteristics of a
REIT did not show up significant in the period pre-1996. The positive coefficients for these
variables mean that with higher liquidity, the higher the observed payout from REITs.
Study Period (1996 - 1997)
Exhibit 26
OLS Multivariate Regression results:
Study period from 1996 through 1997.
POST - 1995
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Short-Term Debt to Total Assets DAS 0.575927 0.435507 1.322431 0.1896
Total Debt to Market Cap DDM 0.553994 0.17484 3.168583 0.0021
Long-Term Debt to Total Debt LON 0.286797 0.127508 2.249247 0.0271
EBITDA to Interest Expense RNI 0.357728 0.194029 1.843682 0.0687
R-Square 0.1388
In the more recent period, the ratios DDM, debt to market capitalization, is significant at
the 95%CI. The DDM coefficient is positive and, therefore the greater the leverage the higher
the payout ratios. This is interestingly the opposite of results obtained in the first OLS regression
46 RNI is the coverage ratio, EBITDA to interest expense.
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for the period pre-1996. The higher payout ratios observed for the period post-1995 may be
explained by a shift to lower FFO figures and not higher dividend payouts. Higher leverage
ratios that would expectedly reduce FFO, combined with a relatively constant dividend payment
over time, would result in higher payout ratios. This reaffirms our earlier conclusion that a
regime shift in the capital markets has occurred during the study period, where REITs are being
gradually encouraged to increase leverage. A corresponding change in dividend policy has not
taken place as suggested by Masulis (1989) 48, because investors are concerned about healthy
payout ratios.
The variable RNI appear significant at the 90% CI in the period post-1996, with a T-stat
of +1.6565 and coefficient of +0.3436. As expected, an increase in the coverage ratio, EBITDA
to interest expense, of 10% translates into a 3.4% increase in the payout ratio. Accompanying
the regime shift, in the debt versus equity choice and dynamics of REIT capital structure, was the
understanding that higher coverage ratios would allow REITs to meet existing interest payments
and distribute higher dividends to existing stockholders.
The positive coefficient for the MBV variable in the first OLS regression equation (see
Appendix) indicates that REITs with higher growth prospects have higher payout ratios. This is
counterintuitive, as the general consensus on high growth firms is that external financing is
difficult to obtain. The need for internal financing is then crucial for growth and would result in
lower payout ratios as high-growth firms attempt to finance internally, to the extent possible. The
model indicates that with the combination of high growth and high payout ratios, that REITs are
4 SHT is the ratio of short-term debt to total debt.
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financing their capital requirements for growth with debt or equity, and not with the reinvestment
of earnings. This, together with the perception that the public markets are encouraging REITs to
lever up, provides a plausible explanation for the positive coefficient of the MBV ratio.
Conclusion
For the pre-1996 period, the opportunities for growth through acquisitions were readily
available. Positive spread investing was coined during this environment of growth opportunities
and was available to most REITs up until 1995. For the period pre-1996, REITs with a lower
cost of capital were able to acquire higher quality assets and grow FFO. The model had
predicted a positive relationship between the market capitalization (MCAP) variable and payout
ratio. In general, we believe larger REITs with a lower cost of capital49 were able to access
equity more easily, and partake in the acquisition opportunities of the early nineties.
Although for the period post-1995, the MCAP variable did not show up as significant,
this was indicative of the lower growth opportunities after the IPO booms in 1994. The MBV
variable which proxies the growth opportunities priced in the market value of the firm's equity,
was decreasing during the two study periods. More importantly, the changes in the signs of the
coefficients of the variables, that introduce the effects of leverage and liquidity between the two
study periods, is again of the regime shift identified in the earlier analyses. This shift has
important ramifications for and, is reflected in, the dynamics of REIT capital structure.
48 Masulis, R., "The Debt/Equity Choice." Ballinger Publishing Co., 1989.
49 A lower cost of capital is not simply a factor of size but rather the expected return by investors, from the REIT, plus the cost of
debt to the firm adjusted for the debt and equity mix.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion
This thesis explores several theoretical issues concerning the changing capital structure
and dividend policy of REITs, and provides empirical analyses that attempt to support the theory.
The theory of corporate capital structure begins by assuming a frictionless and efficient market,
and then theorizes about the impact of the various frictions and inefficiencies in the actual
markets. One of the major frictions for which there have been competing theories is tax. Since
REITs are tax-exempt entities at the corporate level, the study of the market behavior around
REITs provide very interesting insight into the behavior of capital markets without taxes.
Using event-study methodology, the first empirical portion of the thesis documents an
immediate negative market reaction to the first introduction of unsecured debt into the capital
structure of REITs. The event study also documents a positive reaction to a REIT issuing a
follow-on offering of unsecured debt. This indicates that the friction causing the abnormal
negative return when firms issue their IPO of unsecured debt is not taxes. The event study also
indicates that the abnormal returns, both the negative return for IPO issues and the positive return
for follow-on issues, are diminishing in their magnitude over time. This is the first indication
that there has been a regime shift in REITs regarding the use of unsecured debt.
In the next phase of the thesis we have sought to disentangle the characteristics of the
REIT and the debt offerings that explain the market's reactions to the issuance of unsecured debt.
To do this, we have regressed various characteristics of the market, the issuing firm and the
specific debt instrument against the cumulative abnormal return for the event period. Regression
results indicate the market value to book value ratio, which is used as a proxy for a firm's growth
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prospects, is the most significant factor in explaining the market's negative reaction to unsecured
debt IPOs. We hypothesize that the first issuance of unsecured debt into the capital structure of a
REIT provides a signal to the market about the firm's future growth opportunities, causing a
negative abnormal return. The time variable, with a negative coefficient for IPOs and a positive
coefficient for follow-on issues, provides additional evidence of a regime shift with regard to
unsecured debt, as it confirms a lessening of the stock-price reaction of more recent issues.
In the next chapter we have identified factors that explain most of the pricing of recent
IPO issues of unsecured debt by REITs. Through our analysis, we have also identified
indications of a regime shift in the market for unsecured REIT debt, both over time and between
IPO and follow on offerings. For IPO issues, there are indications that there has been a change in
the pricing of unsecured debt by REITs. These include a sign shift in the coefficient for the
Percent Mortgage Free variable, along with a dramatic increase in the variable's significance and
a sign change in the coefficient for the reaction to changes in the slope of the yield curve. Also,
prior to 1996, the factors that explained most of the pricing of IPO issues of unsecured debt also
explained the pricing of secondary issues of unsecured debt as well. In the current market, it
appears that pricing of secondary issues of unsecured debt is explained by different factors than
those that explain the pricing of IPO debt.
Chapter 6 of the thesis begins by identifying the factors that encourage REITs to issue
unsecured debt for their capital needs, as opposed to traditional mortgage debt or equity. The
methodology employed here explores the reasons for unsecured debt offerings by examining and
identifying issues pertinent to the capital structure of REITs', prior to the public offering of
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securities. The most interesting results from the logistic regressions are evidence of an observed
regime shift in the preference in the use of debt by REITs. It appears that REITs are being
encouraged to increase leverage by the capital markets for the observation period post-1995.
Prior to the shift in preferences, leverage in REITs had negatively influenced the decision to issue
unsecured debt. With the increased and continual use of unsecured debt financing by REITs, the
impact of leverage on the decision to issue unsecured debt over traditional equity has been
somewhat mitigated and no longer appears significant for the period post-1996. This increased
use of unsecured debt by REITs is consistent with the observed shrinking of growth
opportunities, as lower growth opportunities translate into more tangible assets on the firm's
balance sheet that are more easily financed with debt.
The final two chapters of the thesis examine the dividend policies of REITs and how they
have changed over time. First, the time-series analysis indicates that in general, as REITs have
become more prominent in the market, payout ratios have decreased, allowing REITs to generate
capital through retained earnings to the extent possible given the minimum-payout requirements.
Consistent with our observations of lower growth opportunities, most of this apparent decline in
payout ratios took place between 1990 and 1993. Since, 1995 payout ratios appear to have
leveled off. This chapter also includes an analysis of the changing dividend policy of REITs over
time by property focus. In all property types except for hotel, storage and healthcare, the long-
terms trend in the payout ratio is down. Not surprisingly, the observed volatility of cash flows
and property specific issues, like lease terms and capital expenditures, impacts on the REITs
ability to maintain a healthy payout ratio over time.
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Through the use of OLS regression analysis, we have tried to identify the factors that
affect dividend policy in REITs. The results of the OLS analyses appear to be consistent with a
regime shift having taken place during the study period. Sign changes in the coefficients of the
variables that introduce the effects of leverage and liquidity, between the two study periods
provide some evidence of the shift in preferences between debt and equity financing.
For the period pre-1996, market capitalization also had a significant impact on the payout
ratio for REITs. We hypothesize that larger REITs with lower costs of capital, at that time, were
able to access equity capital more easily and partake in the benefits of positive spread investing.
Not surprisingly the effects of leverage had a negative relationship to payout ratios. Later, with
the accompanying regime shift in the preference for the increased use of debt; the effects of
leverage appeared significant but were positively correlated to the payout ratio. Ultimately,
increases in leverage with the continued use of unsecured debt by REITs will be tempered by the
cost of debt to the firm, in order to compensate lenders for the higher default risk associated with
this form of risky debt.
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Appendix 1
CAR Data Set for Chapter 4
IPO Unsecured Debt Data Set
No. Security Date AR(-4,0) IPO Maturity Max Debt DCR %Free 20yr-3mo UPREIT MV/BV Resd Reti/Rest
2 KIM 09/24/93 -0.06425 1 10.0 0.65 1.50 0% 0.0264 0 1.66 0 1
6 UDR 03/30/94 -0.00274 1 5.0 0.60 1.50 0% 0.0374 1 1.43 1 0
12 FRT 01/11/95 -0.02474 1 5.0 0.65 1.50 0% 0.0235 0 1.14 0 1
13 WRP 01/23/95 0.00607 1 7.0 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0226 0 0.88 1 0
14 CPJ 02/23/95 -0.02354 1 5.0 0.50 1.50 150% 0.0224 1 1.62 1 0
15 SCN 02/24/95 -0.04204 1 15.5 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0194 1 1.21 0 0
16 NPR 03/30/95 -0.01499 1 10.0 0.65 1.50 100% 0.0184 0 1.76 0 1
18 AEC 04/19/95 0.01363 1 5.0 0.65 1.50 150% 0.0184 0 1.29 1 0
25 AVN 09/13/95 -0.00013 1 7.0 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0132 0 1.23 1 0
26 DRE 09/19/95 0.00487 1 9.0 0.55 2.00 185% 0.0141 1 0.97 0 0
27 RET 10/27/95 -0.01825 1 5.0 0.50 2.00 200% 0.0115 0 0.99 1 0
30 FFA 11/21/95 -0.00146 1 6.3 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0100 0 1.18 0 1
32 SPK 12/06/95 0.01186 1 6.1 0.60 1.50 165% 0.0077 1 1.21 0 0
33 CCG 01/23/96 -0.01473 1 5.0 0.60 2.00 0% 0.0117 1 1.42 0 1
34 CPT 02/15/96 -0.02968 1 5.0 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0144 0 1.07 1 0
36 SKT 03/07/96 0.04834 1 5.0 0.60 2.00 0% 0.0166 1 1.19 0 1
37 IRT 03/21/96 -0.00389 1 5.0 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0184 0 0.98 0 1
38 SUI 04/24/96 0.00480 1 6.1 0.55 1.50 150% 0.0201 1 1.44 1 0
40 TRI 05/17/96 -0.00420 1 6.7 0.55 2.00 185% 0.0202 0 1.12 0 0
43 CLP 07/18/96 -0.00111 1 7.5 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0191 1 1.15 0 0
45 WRE 08/08/96 -0.03055 1 8.5 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0188 0 1.80 0 0
51 SUS 11/04/96 -0.00295 1 7.0 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0172 1 1.35 1 0
53 OAS 11/20/96 -0.00244 1 7.3 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0147 0 0.91 1 0
54 SPG 11/21/96 -0.00520 1 10.0 0.60 1.75 150% 0.0148 1 1.34 0 1
66 SHU 04/22/97 -0.02545 1 8.5 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0180 0 1.13 0 0
67 0 05/01/97 0.01981 1 10.0 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0178 0 1.09 0 1
69 FR 05/08/97 -0.01405 1 18.0 0.60 1.50 150% 0.0180 1 1.22 0 0
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Appendix 2
CAR Data Set for Chapter 4
Secondary Offering Data Set for CAR Regressions
No. Security CAR(-4,0) MV/BV Date Maturity MaxDebt DCR %Free 20yr-3mo UPREIT Resd Retl/Rest
KIM 0.025450 2.2488 02/03/94
WIR 0.067090 0.9330 02/16/94
TCO -0.016536 1.3633 06/22/94
UDR 0.011683 1.3531 09/20/94
TCO 0.050866 1.2733 10/28/94
EQR 0.081377 1.1220 12/14/94
EQR -0.010338 1.0541 04/13/95
SCN 0.011225 1.1930 05/09/95
DDR 0.044866 1.2373 05/10/95
NPR 0.004588 1.8342 05/31/95
TCO -0.029602 1.3527 06/22/95
WRP -0.009343 0.9342 08/21/95
MRY -0.032632 0.9389 11/03/95
AEC -0.058614 1.0681 11/10/95
FRT 0.060731 1.1968 12/04/95
PTR 0.081154 1.0967 02/20/96
SCN -0.031383 1.0244 05/14/96
UDR 0.012640 1.1220 07/09/96
SPK 0.011861 1.2531 07/17/96
EQR 0.002744 1.1124 08/08/96
FRT 0.000772 1.1958 08/13/96
PTR -0.000978 1.0944 10/16/96
CCG -0.011617 1.3675 10/18/96
RET 0.009356 1.0446 10/31/96
CPT -0.010890 1.1487 11/14/96
HIW 0.018540 1.2076 11/26/96
SPK 0.014646 1.3273 12/05/96
UDR 0.004604 1.1251 01/22/97
SCN -0.006069 1.1305 01/31/97
PPS -0.025571 1.3209 03/03/97
PTR 0.002129 1.2077 03/27/97
PPS 0.041489 1.3507 03/27/97
CPT 0.004630 1.1478 05/06/97
NPR 0.001718 1.4414 05/14/97
KIM 0.005623 1.3029 05/27/97
SUS 0.023913 1.3709 05/29/97
WRI 0.039072 1.5275 06/16/97
RET -0.038191 1.0987 06/17/97
SPG -0.010049 1.4262 06/20/97
BRE 0.006293 1.3448 06/23/97
5 0.65000 1.50
10 0.55000 2.00
5 0.60000 1.50
30 0.60000 1.50
3 0.60000 1.60
3 0.60000 1.50
7 0.60000 1.50
10 0.60000 1.50
5 0.65000 1.50
7 0.65000 1.50
7 0.60000 1.60
10 0.60000 1.50
9 0.60000 1.50
7 0.65000 1.50
10 0.65000 1.50
18 0.60000 1.50
13 0.60000 1.50
10 0.60000 1.50
9 0.60000 1.50
30 0.60000 1.50
30 0.65000 1.30
10 0.60000 1.50
5 0.60000 2.00
10 0.50000 2.00
10 0.60000 1.50
9 0.60000 1.50
12 0.60000 1.50
10 0.60000 1.50
18 0.60000 1.50
3 0.60000 1.50
16 0.60000 1.50
5 0.60000 1.50
5 0.60000 1.50
6 0.65000 1.50
8 0.65000 1.50
20 0.60000 1.50
26 0.60000 1.50
7 0.50000 2.00
8 0.60000 1.75
10 0.60000 1.50
0% 3.250%
0% 3.250%
0% 3.340%
0% 3.310%
0% 3.080%
0% 2.320%
0% 1.840%
150% 1.360%
135% 1.400%
100% 1.090%
0% 1.100%
150% 1.500%
40% 1.020%
150% 0.970%
0% 0.760%
0% 1.620%
150% 2.030%
0% 2.070%
165% 2.020%
150% 1.880%
0% 1.880%
0% 1.950%
0% 1.900%
200% 1.710%
150% 1.500%
200% 1.490%
165% 1.690%
0% 1.860%
150% 1.840%
150% 1.840%
150% 1.970%
150% 1.970%
150% 1.770%
100% 1.790%
100% 1.930%
150% 1.960%
100% 1.730%
200% 1.730%
150% 1.640%
150% 1.720%
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01
0
0
01
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
1
0
0
. -
Appendix 3
IPO Pricing Data for Chapter 5
IPO Data Set BBOver Regression Pay
No. Security BPs Over Date Rating DCR MV/BV %Debt %Free 20yr-3mo Issue Amt UPREIT
I FUR 352 09/24/93 1.5 2.00 0.9985 50% 0% 2.640% $100 0
2 KIM 125 09/24/93 8.0 1.50 1.6643 0% 0% 2.640% $100 0
3 PTR 120 02/01/94 7.0 1.50 1.0781 50% 0% 3.340% $200 0
5 UDR 108 03/30/94 7.0 1.50 1.4316 80% 0% 3.740% $75 1
8 FRT 110 01/11/95 7.0 1.50 1.1444 80% 0% 2.350% $100 0
9 WRP 165 01/23/95 7.0 1.50 0.9500 100% 150% 2.260% $100 0
10 CPJ 165 02/23/95 5.0 1.50 1.6178 100% 150% 2.240% $75 1
11 SCN 175 02/24/95 6.5 1.50 1.2147 100% 150% 1.940% $50 1
12 SCN 140 02/24/95 6.5 1.50 1.2147 100% 150% 1.940% $150 1
13 NPR 78 03/30/95 9.5 1.50 1.7552 60% 100% 1.840% $100 0
15 AEC 165 04/19/95 5.0 1.50 1.2927 100% 150% 1.840% $75 0
22 MRY 118 06/20/95 6.5 1.50 1.0132 0% 40% 1.100% $120 0
26 AVN 130 09/13/95 6.0 1.50 1.2316 100% 150% 1.320% $100 0
27 DRE 130 09/19/95 6.0 2.00 0.9689 50% 185% 1.410% $150 1
28 RET 160 10/27/95 5.0 2.00 0.9944 90% 200% 1.150% $100 0
32 FFA 198 11/21/95 5.0 1.50 1.1826 100% 150% 1.000% $50 0
33 FFA 150 11/21/95 5.0 1.50 1.1826 100% 150% 1.000% $150 0
35 SPK 140 12/06/95 6.0 1.50 1.2078 100% 165% 0.770% $110 1
36 SPK 120 12/06/95 6.0 1.50 1.2078 100% 165% 0.770% $100 1
37 SPK 130 12/06/95 6.0 1.50 1.2078 100% 165% 0.770% $50 1
39 CCG 250 01/23/96 4.0 2.00 1.4184 100% 0% 1.170% $100 1
40 CPT 150 02/15/96 5.0 1.50 1.0733 100% 150% 1.440% $100 0
43 SKT 325 03/07/96 3.5 2.00 1.1874 100% 0% 1.660% $75 1
44 IRT 145 03/21/96 5.0 1.50 0.9804 100% 150% 1.840% $50 0
45 SUI 108 04/24/96 5.0 1.50 1.4390 30% 150% 2.010% $65 1
46 SUI 120 04/24/96 5.0 1.50 1.4390 30% 150% 2.010% $85 1
50 TRI 95 05/17/96 5.5 2.00 1.1240 100% 185% 2.020% $100 0
51 TRI 132 05/17/96 5.5 2.00 1.1240 100% 185% 2.020% $50 0
55 CLP 95 07/18/96 5.0 1.50 1.1512 70% 150% 1.910% $65 1
56 CLP 128 07/18/96 5.0 1.50 1.1512 70% 150% 1.910% $65 1
58 WRE 85 08/08/96 7.0 1.50 1.7963 70% 150% 1.880% $50 0
59 WRE 95 08/08/96 7.0 1.50 1.7963 70% 150% 1.880% $50 0
61 PPS 71 09/25/96 7.0 1.50 1.3680 100% 150% 2.110% $100 1
62 PPS 83 09/25/96 7.0 1.50 1.3680 100% 150% 2.110% $25 1
71 SUS 95 11/04/96 5.0 1.50 1.3547 70% 150% 1.720% $100 1
73 OAS 80 11/20/96 5.0 1.50 0.9097 100% 150% 1.470% $50 0
74 OAS 95 11/20/96 5.0 1.50 0.9097 100% 150% 1.470% $50 0
75 OAS 110 11/20/96 5.0 1.50 0.9097 100% 150% 1.470% $50 0
76 SPG 82 11/21/96 6.5 1.75 1.3445 100% 150% 1.480% $250 1
83 EWR 85 03/27/97 5.0 1.50 1.1954 100% 150% 1.970% $75 1
84 EWR 95 03/27/97 5.0 1.50 1.1954 100% 150% 1.970% $50 1
89 SHU 82 04/22/97 6.0 1.50 1.1311 90% 150% 1.800% $50 0
90 SHU 71 04/22/97 6.0 1.50 1.1311 90% 150% 1.800% $50 0
91 0 105 05/01/97 5.0 1.50 1.0911 90% 150% 1.780% $110 0
92 FR 88 05/08/97 6.0 1.50 1.2207 100% 150% 1.800% $150 1
93 FR 60 05/08/97 6.0 1.50 1.2207 100% 150% 1.800% $100 1
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Appendix 4
Follow-On Pricing Data for Chapter 5
Secondary Offering Data Set BBOver Regression Pay
No. Security BPs Over Date Rating DCR MV/BV %Debt %Free 20yr-3mo Issue Amt UPREIT
WIR
TCO
UDR
EQR
SCN
SCN
SCN
SCN
DDR
NPR
TCO
WRP
WRP
MRY
MRY
AEC
FRT
SPK
PTR
PTR
SCN
SCN
SCN
UDR
SPK
SPK
EQR
FRT
PTR
PTR
PTR
PTR
PTR
PTR
PTR
RET
CPT
HIW
HIW
SPK
SPK
UDR
SCN
PTR
PTR
PPS
PPS
SUS
RET
BRE
200 02/16/94
120 06/22/94
100 09/20/94
120 04/13/95
135 05/09/95
100 05/09/95
105 05/09/95
95 05/09/95
145 05/10/95
70 05/31/95
165 06/22/95
140 08/21/95
110 08/21/95
106 11/03/95
102 11/03/95
125 11/10/95
101 12/04/95
147 01/19/96
117 02/20/96
145 02/20/96
90 05/14/96
132 05/14/96
175 05/14/96
95 07/09/96
121 07/17/96
95 07/17/96
100 08/08/96
93 08/13/96
52 10/16/96
65 10/16/96
70 10/16/96
75 10/16/96
78 10/16/96
83 10/16/96
42 10/16/96
115 10/31/96
101 11/14/96
80 11/26/96
95 11/26/96
94 12/05/96
135 12/05/96
79 01/22/97
123 01/31/97
83 03/27/97
110 03/27/97
65 03/27/97
50 03/27/97
120 05/29/97
83 06/17/97
84 06/23/97
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5.5 2.00 0.9330 40%
5.5 1.50 1.3633 100%
7.0 1.50 1.3531 80%
6.0 1.50 1.0541 100%
6.5 1.50 1.1930 100%
6.5 1.50 1.1930 100%
6.5 1.50 1.1930 100%
6.5 1.50 1.1930 100%
5.5 1.50 1.2373 100%
9.5 1.50 1.8342 60%
5.5 1.60 1.3527 100%
7.0 1.50 0.9342 100%
7.0 1.50 0.9342 100%
6.5 1.50 0.9389 0%
6.5 1.50 0.9389 0%
5.0 1.50 1.0681 100%
7.0 1.50 1.1968 80%
6.0 1.50 1.2078 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0967 50%
7.0 1.50 1.0967 50%
6.5 1.50 1.0244 100%
6.5 1.50 1.0244 100%
6.5 1.50 1.0244 100%
7.0 1.50 1.1220 80%
6.0 1.50 1.2531 100%
6.0 1.50 1.2531 100%
6.0 1.50 1.1124 100%
7.0 1.30 1.1958 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0944 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0944 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0944 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0944 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0944 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0944 100%
7.0 1.50 1.0944 100%
5.0 2.00 1.0446 90%
5.0 1.50 1.1487 100%
6.0 1.50 1.2076 0%
6.0 1.50 1.2076 0%
6.0 1.50 1.3273 100%
6.0 1.50 1.3273 100%
7.0 1.50 1.1251 100%
6.5 1.50 1.1305 50%
7.0 1.50 1.2077 50%
7.0 1.50 1.2077 50%
7.0 1.50 1.3507 100%
7.0 1.50 1.3507 100%
5.0 1.50 1.3709 100%
5.0 2.00 1.0987 100%
6.0 1.50 1.3448 50%
0% 3.250%
0% 3.340%
0% 3.310%
0% 1.840%
150% 1.360%
150% 1.360%
150% 1.360%
150% 1.360%
135% 1.400%
100% 1.090%
0% 1.100%
150% 1.500%
150% 1.500%
40% 1.020%
40% 1.020%
150% 0.970%
0% 0.760%
165% 0.770%
0% 1.620%
0% 1.620%
150% 2.030%
150% 2.030%
150% 2.030%
0% 2.070%
165% 2.020%
165% 2.020%
150% 1.880%
0% 1.880%
0% 1.950%
0% 1.950%
0% 1.950%
0% 1.950%
0% 1.950%
0% 1.950%
0% 1.950%
200% 1.710%
150% 1.500%
200% 1.490%
200% 1.490%
165% 1.690%
165% 1.690%
0% 1.860%
150% 1.840%
150% 1.970%
150% 1.970%
150% 1.970%
150% 1.970%
150% 1.960%
200% 1.730%
150% 1.720%
$50
$200
$150
$125
$75
$18
$18
$15
$100
$81
$100
$70
$55
$40
$40
$10
$40
$100
$50
$100
$50
$100
$50
$125
$100
$50
$150
$50
$15
$20
$20
$20
$20
$20
$15
$55
$75
$100
$110
$100
$25
$125
$100
$20
$30
$13
$37
$100
$50
$50
Appendix 5
Logit Regression Results for Chapter 6
PRE - 1996
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
AGE Age since IPO 0.00032 0.00020 1.58202 0.11910
DAS Short-Term Debt to Total Assets -0.13034 0.11925 -1.09302 0.27890
DDM Debt to Market Cap -0.02282 0.04230 -0.53940 0.59170
DIR Dividend Reinvestment Policy 0.95930 0.91397 1.04959 0.29830
ENC Secured Debt to Total Debt -0.04338 0.03133 -1.38455 0.17150
LON Long-Term Debt to Total Debt 0.02359 0.01957 1.20555 0.23290
MBV Market to Book Value -0.00890 0.01496 -0.59486 0.55430
MCAP Total Market Capitalization 0.00153 0.00077 2.00063 0.05010
PAY Payout Ratio 0.00880 0.01607 0.54740 0.58620
RNI EBITDA to Interest Expense -0.11083 0.08328 -1.33075 0.18850
UPR UPREIT status -1.69150 0.89799 -1.88365 0.06460
DIV Diversified 1.29781 1.71555 0.75650 0.45240
C Intercept -1.60881 2.87579 -0.55943 0.57800
Log likelihood -22.46306
Obs with Dep=1 16
Obs with Dep=0 55
POST - 1995
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
AGE Age since IPO 0.00006 0.00012 0.56424 0.57420
DAS Short-Term Debt to Total Assets 0.06910 0.07616 0.90737 0.36700
DDM Debt to Market Cap 0.03464 0.04135 0.83759 0.40490
DIR Dividend Reinvestment Policy 0.80261 0.62679 1.28051 0.20420
ENC Secured Debt to Total Debt -0.07264 0.02426 -2.99455 0.00370
LON Long-Term Debt to Total Debt 0.02153 0.02269 0.94874 0.34570
MBV Market to Book Value 0.02149 0.01459 1.47306 0.14480
MCAP Total Market Capitalization 0.00109 0.00046 2.37975 0.01980
PAY Payout Ratio 0.01127 0.01529 0.73684 0.46350
RNI EBITDA to Interest Expense -0.02754 0.04560 -0.60402 0.54760
UPR UPREIT status 0.32104 0.76513 0.41959 0.67600
DIV Diversified -1.66379 1.58639 -1.04879 0.29760
C Intercept -7.61831 3.38127 -2.25309 0.02710
Log likelihood -37.02275
Obs with Dep=1 24
Obs with Dep=0 66
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Appendix 6
OLS Regression Results for Chapter 8
Dependent Variable: Dividend Payout Ratio
PRE - 1996
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
AGE Age since IPO 0.00221 0.00161 1.37649 0.17390
DAS Short-Term Debt to Total Assets 0.53434 1.11836 0.47779 0.63460
DDM Debt to Market Cap -1.87933 1.20364 -1.56138 0.12380
DET Debt to Total Assets 1.32673 1.03837 1.27770 0.20640
MBV Market to Book Value -0.19141 0.23739 -0.80632 0.42330
MCAP Total Market Cap 0.01655 0.00950 1.74286 0.08660
RNI EBITDA to Interest Expense 0.06693 0.41067 0.16297 0.87110
VAR Variable Rate Debt to Total Debt -0.10553 0.15441 -0.68344 0.49700
UPR UPREIT status 3.78926 9.06600 0.41796 0.67750
SHT Short-Term Debt to Total Debt 0.00070 0.45432 0.00154 0.99880
C Intercept 96.25506 32.30842 2.97926 0.00420
R-Square 0.25225 Mean dependent var 79.48693
Adjusted R-squared 0.12551 S.D. dependent var 35.37829
S.E. of regression 33.08367 Akaike info criterion 7.14141
Sum squared resid 64577.21 Schwarz criterion 7.49474
Log likelihood -338.28 F-statistic 1.99034
Durbin-Watson stat 2.26689 Prob(F-statistic) 0.05063
POST - 1995
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
AGE Age since IPO 0.00046 0.00096 0.48459 0.62930
DAS Short-Term Debt to Total Assets 0.53987 0.51178 1.05488 0.29470
DDM Debt to Market Cap 0.81400 0.62444 1.30355 0.19620
LON Long-Term Debt to Total Debt 0.25768 0.14975 1.72069 0.08920
MBV Market to Book Value 0.07575 0.15565 0.48664 0.62790
MCAP Total Market Cap -0.00130 0.00406 -0.31959 0.75010
RNI EBITDA to Interest Expense 0.32791 0.20050 1.63545 0.10590
VAR Variable Rate Debt to Total Debt -0.16573 0.45791 -0.36192 0.71840
UPR UPREIT status 5.43691 5.87869 0.92485 0.35790
DIV Diversified -19.22388 9.94301 -1.93341 0.05680
C Intercept 23.17139 23.71613 0.97703 0.33150
R-Square 0.22858 Mean dependent var 83.47790
Adjusted R-squared 0.13093 S.D. dependent var 24.55900
S.E. of regression 22.8949 Akaike info criterion 6.37591
Sum squared resid 41410.04 Schwarz criterion 6.68145
Log likelihood -403.62 F-statistic 2.34080
Durbin-Watson stat 2.17899 Prob(F-statistic) 0.01784
-105-
